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California's Punitive Damages Law:
Continuing to Punish and Deter Despite
State Farm v. Campbell
KATHLEEN S. KIZER*
[P]unitive damages represent the assessment by the jury, as the
voice of the community, of the measure of punishment the
defendant deserved.'
Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely and
with restrain[t], they have the potential to advance legitimate state
interests. Imposed indiscriminately, however, they have a
devastating potential for harm.'
INTRODUCTION
In August 2005, in a lawsuit filed against pharmaceutical giant
Merck & Co., jurors awarded punitive damages of $253.4 million and
compensatory damages of $24 million to the widow of Rob Ernst, a fifty-
nine-year-old marathon runner and triathlete who died after taking
Merck's anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx for eight months. The thin
evidence as to causation has yielded cries of "junk science," but
comments from jurors after the case suggest a reasoned desire to punish
Merck for employing aggressive marketing tactics while disregarding
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 20o6; B.A.,
Georgetown University; Ph.D. in English, Emory University. I would like to thank Professor David I.
Levine for his encouragement, advice, and careful reading of earlier drafts of this Note. All
shortcomings are, of course, my own.
i. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 6oo (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
3. Ruth Rendon & Richard Stewart, Vioxx Jurors Talk About Verdict; Aggressive Marketing
Played A Role, They Say, And One Number Kept Coming Up, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 20, 2005, at AIo.
The punitive damages were reduced to $x.6 million in accordance with Texas law. Alex Berenson, The
Vioxx Decision: The Overview; Jury Calls Merck Liable in Death of Man on Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
20, 2005, at Ai.
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known risks of its drug.4 Well before the case went to trial, reporters
described Merck's marketing tactics:
As academic researchers increasingly raised questions about Vioxx's
heart safety, the company struck back hard. It even sued one Spanish
pharmacologist, trying unsuccessfully to force a correction of an article
he wrote. In another case, it warned that a Stanford University
researcher would "flame out" unless he stopped giving "anti-Merck"
lectures .... A company training document listed potential tough
questions about Vioxx and said in capital letters, "DODGE!"5
Merck created an "obstacle handling guide" for internal marketing
purposes entitled "Dodge Ball Vioxx."' 6 A Stanford Medical School
professor complained to Merck about "a consistent pattern of
intimidation of investigators by Merck."7
The evidence of Merck's marketing tactics convinced the jury that it
needed to send Merck a message. "In interviews after the decision, jurors
said they had made the large punitive award to send a message that drug
makers must disclose the risks of their medicines .... 'Respect us, that's
the message.' ',8 One juror felt Merck should be open, honest, and
4. See, e.g., John E. Calfee, Op-Ed, Junk Science Reigns, N.Y. SUN, Aug. 22, 2005, at 7 (arguing
that in the Ernst case, "junk science" prevailed); Editorial, A Dangerous Vioxx Verdict, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 24, 2005, at C2o ("But finding that the company had unethical marketing is not the same thing as
finding that it caused the death of Robert Ernst."); Mark Donald, Cause and Effect: How Merck Lost
on Vioxx, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Aug. 31, 2005 ("[Tlhe glaring weakness of the case concerned
the element of causation, and on this issue, Merck rested its hopes and its defense."); Editorial,
Message To Drug Companies, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 23, 2005, at A8 ("Although there was no
direct evidence linking Vioxx to Robert C. Ernst's death in 2001, jurors were swayed by company
documents showing that Merck knew as early as 1997 that its arthritis painkiller carried an elevated
risk of heart attacks, yet concealed that information from the public."); Robert Goldberg, Op-Ed,
Vioxx-type Danger and Legal Frivolity; Better, More Rigorous Testing is the Path to Safer Drugs,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2005, at AI7.
Vioxx likely did not cause Mr. Ernst's death.... [T]he jury punished Merck for failing to
change its marketing practice after its own study identified a small group of patients that
had more heart problems after taking Vioxx. It's message was, in the word of the words of
one juror: "Stop doing the minimum to put your drugs on the market."
Id.; see also Editorial, Punishment for Merck, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2005, at A16.
That is an extremely flimsy scientific basis for holding Vioxx responsible, but this case was
less about science than about punishing Merck for what jurors considered an egregious
history of covering up evidence of risk while promoting the drug so heavily to consumers.
Internal e-mail messages and documents showed that Merck scientists had been concerned
about cardiovascular risks even before Vioxx went on the market and continued to be
concerned thereafter, even while resisting regulatory efforts to add warnings to the drug's
label and devising strategies to dodge any concerns from doctors.
Id. For critical analyses of "junk science" in the legal system, see DAVID FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY:
THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW (1999); PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
5. Anna Wilde Mathews & Barbara Martinez, E-Mails Suggest Merck Knew Vioxx's Dangers at
Early Stage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at AI.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Berenson, The Vioxx Decision, supra note 3.
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accountable to the public.9 The amount of punitive damages was not
pulled out of thin air. Rather, in arriving at the amount, the jury focused
on a document created by Merck in which it estimated the "additional
profit" it could make by delaying placement of a label warning of the
drug's risk for cardiac problems, as had been demanded by the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration.'0 The additional profit was precisely the
amount awarded in punitive damages."
Besides the problems with scientific proof and causation raised by
commentators,'2 the case raises questions regarding the proper way to
punish a corporation like Merck when it behaves in ways we, as a society,
abhor. Tort reformers have been agitating for limits on punitive
damages, and many states have responded. For instance, Texas caps
punitive damages and, in the case against Merck, the punitive damages
award of $253.4 million had to be reduced to $i.6 million. Is $I.6 million
sufficient to deter a company like Merck? Although analysts estimate
Merck's liability for Vioxx litigation as high as $5o billion, it is worth
noting that Merck had $22.9 billion in sales in 2004 alone, $2.5 billion per
year of which was attributable to Vioxx, and annual profit of $1.4
billion.'3  Assuming Merck merits punishment, does $1.6 million
adequately punish Merck for withholding information regarding
potential life-threatening risks? What amount would adequately punish
Merck, given that it faces thousands of additional lawsuits and sold Vioxx
to millions of consumers?'
4
The U.S. Supreme Court has heeded calls for tort reform by
decreeing that the Due Process Clause limits the amount of punitive
damages that courts may award.'5 While reviving economic substantive
due process, the Court has provided equivocal guidance regarding the
permissible limits of punitive damages awards. In State Farm v.
9. Verdict Warns Drug Makers Not To Suppress Known Risks, TAMPA TM., Aug. 23, 2005, at to
("'We expect accountability; we expect them to be open with us; we expect them to be honest with us,'
said Marsha Robbins, forewoman of the jury.").
io. Alex Berenson, For Merck, the Vioxx Paper Trail Won't Go Away, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005,
at At.
II. Id.
12. See generally supra note 4.
13. See Berenson, The Vioxx Decision, supra note 3; Berenson, For Merck, the Vioxx Paper Trail
Won't Go Away, supra note so; Bloomberg News, At Vioxx Trial, Witness Says Short-Term Use Posed
a Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at C13. Merck's fate remains uncertain. After the verdict in the
Ernst case in Texas, Merck prevailed in a case in New Jersey but suffered a mistrial in another Texas
case, Plunkett v. Merck, due to a deadlocked jury. Alex Berenson, A Mistrial is Declared in 3rd Suit
Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2005, at C5 ("[L]awyers not involved in the [second Texas] suit said
the mistrial was a bad sign for Merck, which had been expected to win the trial relatively easily after
its victory last month in a similar case in a New Jersey state court.").
14. See Berenson, For Merck, the Vioxx Paper Trail Won't Go Away, supra note so.
15. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 4o8, 416 (2003); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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Campbell, the Court held that the punitive damages awarded in a
particular case must be proportional to the amount of compensatory
damages awarded in that case.' 6 Specifically, the Court stated that "few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.' 7 The Court
further noted that "an award of more than four times the amount of
compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional
impropriety.' 8 When compensatory damages are particularly large, an
award of punitive damages should be closer to a one-to-one ratio. 9
Although the Court refrained from setting a "bright-line ratio," many
commentators have responded by asserting that punitive damages that
are more than nine times compensatory damages are presumptively
unconstitutional." Courts reviewing awards after State Farm have time
and again reduced punitive damages awards, using factors between four
and nine in reliance on the foregoing proclamations by the Court in State
Farm. 1
i6. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. Schwartz and Behrens have noted that the American Bar
Association, the American College of Trial Lawyers, and the American Law Institute have all
advocated limiting punitive damages to a multiple of compensatory damages. See Victor E. Schwartz
& Mark A. Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform-State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the
Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1365, 1378-79
n.82 (1993).
17. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
18. Id. (citations omitted). Stephen C. Yeazell hypothesizes that the Court derived the single digit
multiplier from a statistical analysis of compensatory and punitive damages awards that found that
eighty percent of punitive awards fell within a ratio of slightly more than eight to one. See Stephen C.
Yeazell, Honoring David Shapiro: Punitive Damages, Descriptive Statistics, and the Economy of Civil
Litigation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2025, 2039-40 (2004) (citing Theodore Eisenberg et al., The
Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 651 (I997)).
19. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
20. See, e.g., Mark G. Bonino, The U.S. Supreme Court and Punitive Damages: On the Road to
Reform, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 432, 432 (2003) ("[T]he Court set a single-digit multiplier as the ordinary
constitutional limit for the permissible ratio between compensatory damages and punitive damages.");
Don Willenburg, Fixing the Damage: California Courts are Struggling to Apply Reasonable Limits on
Punitive Damages Awards in Light of State Farm v. Campbell, 27 L.A. LAW. 22, 28 (2004) ("[A] ratio
should generally be no higher than 4 to i and almost never more than 9 to i."). Willenburg's title is
misleading because four of the five California cases he cited reduced punitive damages to within the
ratios mentioned in State Farm. Id. at 24-27.
21. See, e.g., Diamond Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 736, 76o-61, 762
(Ct. App. 2003) (reducing punitive damages in insurance bad faith case to approximately four times
compensatory damages and noting that "anything exceeding four-to-one would not comport with due
process under Campbell"); Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 73 (Ct. App. 2004)
(reducing punitive damages award from a 16.7-to-I ratio to six to one), rev. granted, 88 P.3d 497, rev.
dismissed, 97 P.3d 814, and stay granted, 543 U.S. 952 (2004); Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d
793, 813 (Ct. App. 2003) (reducing punitive damages to approximately five times compensatory
damages); Bardis v. Oates, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 92 (Ct. App. 2004) (reducing punitive damages to nine
times compensatory damages); Textron Fin. Corp. v. Nat'l Union Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Penn., 13 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 586, 605 (Ct. App. 2004) (reducing punitive damages to four times compensatory damages);
see also Sheila L. Birnbaum & Douglas W. Dunham, The Aftermath of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 4o8 (2oo3), A.L.I.-A.B.A. 157, i6o-7o (July 16, 2004) (listing
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In addition to establishing the proportionality rule, the Court in State
Farm asserted that "[t]he wealth of a defendant cannot justify an
otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award."" Because punitive
damages must be proportional to compensatory damages under the
Court's new methodology, it is now unclear whether a defendant's
financial condition is relevant to the punitive damages calculation.
Although the Court made no firm pronouncements about the
discoverability or evidentiary relevance of the defendant's wealth,
commentators have inferred that the wealth of a defendant may now be
irrelevant to the calculation of punitive damages. 3
Both of these assertions-that punitive damages must be
proportional to compensatory damages and that the wealth of the
defendant is irrelevant-are inconsistent with California law prior to
State Farm, and, as this Note argues, grossly overstated. Although
California courts have long considered the amount of compensatory
damages when evaluating whether a jury's award of punitive damages is
excessive, the courts have not established any particular ratio as a
ceiling.24 Furthermore, the defendant's financial condition has been an
integral part of punitive damages jurisprudence in California.25 For
instance, California law requires plaintiffs to present evidence of a
defendant's financial condition in order to obtain a punitive damages
award. 6 This serves to ensure that punitive damages adequately punish
and deter without "financially destroying" the defendant. 7
California courts have begun to reconfigure California's punitive
damages jurisprudence in light of State Farm's pronouncements. In many
cases, California appellate courts have strictly applied the U.S. Supreme
cases in which courts have applied single-digit ratios between compensatory and punitive damages).
22. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 427.
23. See, e.g., DAVID I. LEVINE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 457,
725-26 (2d ed. 2005); Leila C. Orr, Making a Case for Wealth-Calibrated Punitive Damages, 37 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2004) (stating that the "Court severely limited the use of a defendant's wealth
in the calculation of punitive damages"); Willenburg, supra note 20, at 26 (asserting that "the U.S.
Supreme Court arguably rejected the notion that punitive damages may take into consideration the
defendant's wealth"); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Limit Punitive Damages in Victory for Tort
Revision, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2003, at A16 (The Court declared "that juries should generally not be
permitted to consider a defendant's wealth when setting a punitive damage award.").
24. See infra text accompanying notes 2Ol-O6.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 208-17.
26. E.g., Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Cal. i99) (finding that "an award of punitive
damages cannot be sustained on appeal unless the trial record contains meaningful evidence of the
defendant's financial condition"); CAL. CIV. CODE § 32 9 5 (d) (Deering 2oo5) ("Evidence of profit and
financial condition shall be presented to the same trier of fact that found for the plaintiff."); see also
infra Part III.B.3.
27. Murakami, 813 P.2d at 1351-52 ("[Tlhe most important question is whether the amount of the
punitive damages award will have deterrent effect-without being excessive.... Neal recognized that
the purpose of punitive damages is not served by financially destroying a defendant. The purpose is to
deter, not to destroy." (citing Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 98o (Cal. 1978))).
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Court's proportionality rule and reduced punitive damages awards."
Many California courts have incorporated California's traditional
emphasis on the defendant's financial condition into the State Farm
framework.29 And in reviewing two cases,0 the California Supreme Court
has shown how California courts may accommodate the U.S. Supreme
Court's concerns without losing sight of the state's longstanding interest3'
in imposing punitive damages that actually seek to deter persons from
engaging in intentional tortious conduct that harms others.
This Note will evaluate the impact on California law of the U.S.
Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence culminating in State
Farm. It will critique the Court's constitutional pronouncements
regarding punitive damages, and suggest judicial and legislative
responses so that California may continue to pursue its legitimate
interest in imposing punitive damages that aim to deter reprehensible
conduct. Although many commentators have inferred bright line rules
from State Farm," this Note will show that the opposite is true. The
Court has merely painted broad brush strokes, leaving the states to fill in
the gaps so that awards of punitive damages are scaled to the
reprehensibility of a particular defendant's conduct.
Part I of this Note will review the concerns expressed by the Court in
cases preceding State Farm. These cases show an evolution from
procedural to substantive due process, but as Justice Scalia has pointed
out, the substantive due process rests on a shallow foundation.33 Part II
will review State Farm's procedural and substantive concerns. Despite its
impact, the opinion is remarkably short. It borrows heavily and cites
almost exclusively from the six punitive damages cases the Court decided
in the dozen years preceding it.34 Dicta in State Farm appear to contradict
pronouncements made in the earlier cases, but it does not appear that
the Court intended to overturn them. This Note will argue that the
procedural concerns of those earlier cases remain vital and that due
attention to them will ensure California's compliance with the Court's
punitive damages jurisprudence.
Part III will present an overview of the considerable procedural
28. See supra note 2 1.
29. See infra notes 343-45.
30. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 113 P.3d 82 (Cal. 2005); Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co.,
Inc., 113 P.3d 63 (Cal. 2005).
31. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 380 (Ct. App. 1981) (noting that
punitive damages were permitted under "the common law of this state long before the Civil Code was
adopted" and were enacted into statute in 1872 (citations omitted)).
32. See supra note 20.
33. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 6oo-ol (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(reviewing the Court's spare precedent and finding none authorized a reduction of a civil fine due to
excessiveness); text accompanying note 115.
34. See infra note 37.
[Vol. 57:827
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CALIFORNIA
protections California punitive damages law provides, and will outline
the role of wealth in calculating punitive damages in California. Part IV
will study the opinions in two California cases decided after State Farm.
In Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co.,35 the California Supreme Court
reduced a punitive damages award of $1.7 million to $50,000, where
compensatory damages were $5,000. In doing so, however, the court
elaborated on State Farm to provide useful guidance regarding the use of
potential harm as a factor in calculating punitive damages. In Johnson v.
Ford Motor Co.,6 decided on the same day as Simon, the California
Supreme Court overturned an appellate court's reduction of a punitive
damages award, holding that the lower court misapplied State Farm's
proportionality rule and recommending an increase in the amount of
punitive damages. Johnson interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court's
pronouncements regarding the relevance of evidence of other bad acts by
the defendant and explained how that evidence may justify augmentation
of a punitive damages award in certain cases.
Simon and Johnson show that strict adherence to ratios is neither
necessary nor reasonable. These cases should provide guidance to other
courts seeking to impose meaningful punitive damages without a slavish
reliance on the proportionality rule. Thus, although the California
Supreme Court's cases do not address every issue raised by the newly
imposed substantive limits, they demonstrate that by carefully
interpreting the U.S. Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence,
California courts may continue to impose punitive damages that serve
the state's interest in deterring and punishing particularly egregious
tortious conduct.
Part V will address potential changes in California's punitive
damages jurisprudence, while recognizing that no single approach and no
single mathematical formula should be applied to all cases in which
punitive damages are sought. Rather, courts ought to follow a much
more nuanced approach than the proportionality rule, one that responds
to the particular facts of each case. Further, when a defendant's financial
condition is relevant to the issue of punitive damages-whether that
evidence be presented in the form of profits earned, costs avoided or net
worth-California courts should continue to permit such evidence with
utmost procedural protection.
Although California courts have begun to adapt California's
punitive damages jurisprudence to the new federal due process concerns,
California courts and legislature should continue to review and revise its
procedures to ensure that defendants are provided more than sufficient
procedural protection. By providing the utmost in procedural
35. 113 P.3d 63 (Cal. 2005).
36. 113 P.3d 82 (Cal. 2005).
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protections, ensuring evidentiary relevance, and recognizing that no
single approach will suffice in all cases, California courts can justify both
their continued use of evidence of the defendant's financial condition
and, in appropriate cases, affirmation of awards greater than nine times
compensatory damages.
I. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S PUNITIVE DAMAGES
JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE STATE FARM
Six cases form the backdrop for State Farm, beginning with a 1989
case that held that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause does
not apply to punitive damages awards in civil disputes between private
parties.37 These cases evince an ongoing struggle by the Court to
articulate standards for the imposition of punitive damages. Taken as a
whole, the pronouncements in these cases are equivocating and
imprecise, providing little guidance to courts reviewing punitive damages
awards.' Nevertheless, these cases help flesh out and contextualize State
37. The cases preceding State Farm are, in chronological order: Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt.,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to punitive damages awards in civil suits between private plaintiffs); Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. i (i9i) (holding that due process is satisfied by jury instructions
and appellate review according to established standards); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 5o9
U.S. 443 (1993) (holding that the potential for considerable harm justified a punitive damages award
dramatically disproportionate to the actual damages incurred); Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512
U.S. 415 (1994) (declaring unconstitutional an amendment to Oregon's Constitution that prohibited
judicial review of punitive damages awards unless there was no evidence to support the award);
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001) (holding that federal courts
must review punitive damages awards de novo); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)
(declaring unconstitutional punitive damages award of $2,000,000 where compensatory damages were
$4,ooo, and holding that out-of-state conduct could not be considered in awarding punitive damages).
38. The procedural history of one California case bears witness to the lack of guidance provided
by the Supreme Court's decisions. In Textron Financial Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586 (Ct. App. 2o04), a bad faith insurance case, a jury
awarded Textron compensatory and punitive damages in the amounts of $1 6 5,414 and $io million,
respectively, but the trial court reduced the punitive award to $1.7 million. The U.S. Supreme Court
heard the case and remanded it for reconsideration in light of Cooper Industries, 532 U.S. 424. See
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Textron Fin. Corp., 534 U.S. 947 (2ooi). On remand, the
California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. Textron Fin. Corp. v. Nat'l Fire Union Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pa., No. Sio8979, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 6248 (2002) (unpublished decision). The case made its
way back to the U.S. Supreme Court again, which remanded it again for reconsideration in light of
State Farm. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Textron Fin. Corp., 538 U.S. 974 (2003).
On its final disposition, the appellate court reduced the punitive damages to $360,000, which was "four
times the compensatory damages awarued on the claims for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing and fraud." Textron, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 605. In calculating the amount of
punitive damages relative to compensatory damages, the court disregarded compensatory damages
awarded for a breach of contract cause of action. Id.
In Gore. the Court's first affirmation of a substantive due process right to reasonable punitive
damages, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority opinion, which he criticized for providing "no real
guidance at all." 517 U.S. at 6o5 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia amplified his criticism:
These criss-crossing platitudes yield no real answers in no real cases. And it must be noted
that the Court nowhere says that these three "guideposts" are the only guideposts; indeed,
1Vol. 57:827
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Farm's markedly qualified language and unclear guidance. Because State
Farm lacks clear rules, it is instructive to study the procedural concerns
the Court expressed in its earlier opinions, particularly given State Farm's
heavy reliance on language from those opinions.39 These cases also
demonstrate the shifting attitudes of several of the Justices during the
years leading up to State Farm, a six-to-three decision that embraced
many of the arguments Justice O'Connor made in dissents in cases
preceding State Farm;' depended on Justice Kennedy's about-face
regarding substantive due process;4 ' and revealed an inexplicable voting
pattern by Chief Justice Rehnquist."
A. THE BEGINNING OF A PROPORTIONALITY RULE: JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S
DISSENT IN BROWNING-FERRIS
In an opinion penned by Justice Blackmun," the Court signaled its
willingness to hear a due process challenge to punitive damages in 1989,'
when it rejected a defendant's argument that the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause constrained punitive damages awarded in
disputes between private parties.45 The case, Browning-Ferris Industries
it makes very clear that they are not-explaining away the earlier opinions that do not
really follow these "guideposts" on the basis of additional factors, thereby "reiterating our
rejection of a categorical approach." ... In other words, even these utter platitudes, if they
should ever happen to produce an answer, may be overridden by other unnamed
considerations. The Court has constructed a framework that does not genuinely constrain,
that does not inform state legislatures and lower courts-that does nothing at all except
confer an artificial air of doctrinal analysis upon its essentially ad hoc determination that
this particular award of punitive damages was not "fair."
Id. at 6o6 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
39. In State Farm, Justice Kennedy referred to the "well established" practice of reviewing
punitive damages awards for violations of substantive and procedural due process. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). This assertion appears calculated to create the
appearance of constitutional solidity where there is none: the Court rejected a substantive due process
approach until the Court's I996 decision in Gore, 517 U.S. 559. In fact, only three years before Gore,
the Court categorically rejected substantive due process. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 458 ("Justice Scalia's
assertion notwithstanding, we do not suggest that a defendant has a substantive due process right to a
correct determination of the 'reasonableness' of a punitive damages award." (citation omitted)).
40. See text accompanying notes 50-53 (discussing Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. 257), 69-75
(discussing Haslip, 499 U.S. s), 83-88 (discussing TXO, 509 U.S. 443).
41. See text accompanying notes 9o-91.
42. See infra note 117.
43. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. 257. For Parts I, III and IV, Justice Blackmun wrote for a
unanimous court. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Kennedy and Scalia
joined Part II, in which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to punitive damages.
44. The Court wrote:
There is some authority in our opinions for the view that the Due Process Clause places
outer limits on the size of a civil damages award made pursuant to a statutory scheme,...
but we have never addressed the precise question presented here: whether due process acts
as a check on undue jury discretion to award punitive damages in the absence of any
express statutory limit.
Id. at 276-77 (citing St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919)).
45. The Court's reasoning for rejecting the Excessive Fines Clause reveals an excessively
formalistic bent. The Court wrote: "Given that the Amendment is addressed to bails, fines, and
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of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., concerned antitrust violations
and tortious interference with contract on account of Browning-Ferris
Industries' attempts to drive Kelco Disposal out of business.46 Employing
an abuse of discretion standard, the Court affirmed the award of $6
million in punitive damages where compensatory damages were
approximately $5o,ooo. 47 The Court explained its short-lived8s deferential
standard of review:
It is not our role to review directly the award for excessiveness, or to
substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Rather, our only inquiry is
whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant petitioners' motion ...
for a new trial or remittitur. Applying proper deference to the District
Court, the award of punitive damages should stand. 9
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion, joined by Justice
Stevens, in which she laid out the framework that would later be refined
by Justice Kennedy in his opinion for the Court in State Farm." Adapting
the Court's proportionality analysis from criminal sentencing, Justice
O'Connor advocated "'substantial deference' to legislative judgments"
by the reviewing court; punitive damages relative to the gravity of the
defendant's conduct; and comparison of civil and criminal penalties
imposed for similar conduct.5' Significantly, Justice O'Connor rejected
arguments that "the wealth of the defendant should not, as a
constitutional matter, be taken into account in setting the amount of an
award of punitive damages."52 In doing so, however, she evinced a
greater concern with setting a ceiling on punitive damages than with
punishment, our cases have long understood it to apply primarily, and almost exclusively, to criminal
prosecutions and punishments." Therefore, it is inappropriate to apply the Excessive Fines Clause in
the context of civil jury awards. Id. at 262-63. For an argument that the Excessive Fines Clause should
apply to punitive damages, see Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages:
Some Lessons From History, 4o VAND. L. REv. 1233 (1987) (applying the Excessive Fines Clause to
punitive damages is "consistent with the historical development of the textual antecedents of the
eighth amendment," id. at 1234).
46. Id. at 26o-6i.
47. Id. at 262, 28o. The State Farm Court did not disaffirm this opinion despite the 120-to-I ratio
of punitive to compensatory damages.
48. A dozen years later, in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424
(2001), the Court reversed course and held that punitive damages awards must be reviewed de novo.
49. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 278.
50. O'Connor's opinion is a partial concurrence and partial dissent. She concurred as to the
Court's finding that due process claims were not properly raised but dissented as to the Court's
holding that the Excessive Fines Clause was inapplicable to private civil litigation. See id. at 283. Her
opinion sets forth the limits she believes the Excessive Fines Clause imposes on punitive damages
awards. See id. at 300-0t. That analysis is easily translatable to the limits she believes are imposed by
the due process clause. See infra text accompanying notes 69-75 (discussing Justice O'Connor's dissent
in Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)).
51. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 300-oi. O'Connor borrows the "proportionality framework"
from the Court's cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence. Id.
52. Id. at 300.
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establishing a method to ensure that punitive damages are fairly
calculated to achieve their goals of punishment and deterrence.53
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Browning-Ferris suggests a
fundamental unease with the deterrent purpose of punitive damages. The
opinion commenced with an alarmist declaration: "Awards of punitive
damages are skyrocketing."54  After reciting statistics about the
"skyrocketing" punitive damages awarded in the I98os, which pale in
comparison with those awarded since then,55 Justice O'Connor asserted:
The threat of such enormous awards has a detrimental effect on the
research and development of new products. Some manufacturers of
prescription drugs, for example, have decided that it is better to avoid
uncertain liability than to introduce a new pill or vaccine into the
market. Similarly, designers of airplanes and motor vehicles have been
forced to abandon new projects for fear of lawsuits that can often lead
53. See id. ("[Tlhe Excessive Fines Clause is only a substantive ceiling on the amount of a
monetary sanction, and not an economic primer on what factors best further the goals of punishment
and deterrence.").
54 Id. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also W. Kip Viscusi,
The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87
GEO. L.J. 285 (998).
There has been much debate about how common punitive damages actually are. See, e.g.,
THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (2001); CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL.,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURORS DECIDE (2002); Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do
Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 90 (1998); see also Theodore
Eisenberg, Measuring The Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages, 87 GEo. L.J. 347 (1998); Richard
Lempert, Juries, Hindsight and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for Change,
48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867 (1999) (criticizing Sunstein's work); David Luban, A Flawed Case Against
Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359 (1998) (criticizing Sunstein's work); Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 5o BUFF. L. REV. 103
(2002); Neil Vidmar, Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform: Avoidance, Error, and Overreaching
in Sunstein et al.'s Punitive Damages, 53 EMORY L.J. I359, 136o n.2 (2004) (criticizing Sunstein's work).
Jane Mallor and Barry Roberts summarized the debate:
In his comprehensive review of punitive damages, however, Professor Michael Rustad
presents convincing data that such claims are horror stories and are not supported by the
evidence. Professor Rustad reviewed nine empirical studies on punitive damages trends and
concluded that "[e]very empirical study of punitive damages demonstrates that there is no
nationwide punitive damages crisis." In fact, he stated that the clear convergence of findings
is that the "overall rate and level of punitive damages [are] low." Professor Theodore
Eisenberg adds that "[a]ll credible sources suggest that punitive damage awards are rare,"
and that concerns are greatly exaggerated .... In fact, the research also reveals that punitive
damages are most frequently imposed in business tort and intentional tort cases and not in
personal injury cases and that they are substantially and significantly correlated to the size
of the compensatory damages awarded.
Jane Mallor & Barry S. Roberts, Punitive Damages: On the Path To a Principled Approach?, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 1001, 1004-05 (1999) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Mallor & Roberts, On the Path].
Nevertheless, the popular perception that punitive damages were out of control led nearly all of the
state legislatures to enact some form of limitation on the imposition and award of punitive damages.
Id.
55. Justice O'Connor asserted that the largest product liability punitive damages award "a decade
ago" was $250,000. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH.
L. REV. 1257, 1329-32 (1976)). In the I98Os, O'Connor noted, "awards more than 30 times as high have
been sustained," including awards of $ to million, $8 million and $6.2 million. Id. (citations omitted).
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to awards of punitive damages. 56
As sole support for her assertion regarding pharmaceutical companies'
reluctance to introduce new drugs, Justice O'Connor cited the amicus
brief of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.57 It appears a raw
instance of judicial "capture." 5
Justice O'Connor did not appear to consider the possibility that if
manufacturers have become hesitant to market unsafe products, then
punitive damages have had the proper deterrent effect. Perhaps punitive
damages imposed on pharmaceutical companies represent the
community's desire not to be guinea pigs for reckless experimentation.59
Nor did Justice O'Connor acknowledge that without effective regulatory
oversight, society is dependent on the tort system and punitive damages
to police intentional, reprehensible conduct." If, on the other hand,
punitive damages are being imposed on manufacturers of products that
inadvertently or unexpectedly cause harm and those manufacturers
address the harm in a responsible manner, then punitive damages are
being incorrectly imposed. For instance, had Merck solicited and listened
to the many warnings of researchers about Vioxx's potential cardiac
risks, rather than seek to squelch critiques, it likely would not be faced
56. Id. The recent case of Merck's Vioxx drug certainly contradicts O'Connor's assertion that
pharmaceutical companies are constrained from marketing new drugs because of the threat of punitive
damages. See supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text.
57. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Brief for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association et al. as Amici Curiae at 5-23).
58. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 355, 355 (1999)
(arguing that "the judicial process is more susceptible to manipulation by narrow interests than are the
more democratic branches of government"); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts:
1967-1983, 72 Cs!.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997) (applying the notion of "capture" to administrative
agencies).
59. For example, Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc. concerned one pharmaceutical company's
disregard for the health of consumers in its marketing of a cholesterol-reducing drug. 395 S.W.2d 719
(Tex. App. 1965). "Although the company's own experiments showed abnormal blood changes and
eye opacities in animals, the defendant repeatedly covered up reports of these experiments,
fictionalized data, and misrepresented facts to both the medical profession and the Food and Drug
Administration." Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 639, 652 (I98O) [hereinafter Mallor & Roberts, Principled Approach]. When a
pharmaceutical company engages in egregious conduct like misleading the public, falsifying data, and
withholding information about known risks, substantial punitive damages are a necessary remedy. If
punitive damages constrain a company from withholding information and disregarding health risks,
then that is a desirable outcome. It seems reasonable to expect public confidence in such industries to
be impacted by companies' irresponsible actions. That low opinion is reduced to a monetary indicator
by virtue of juries' punitive damages awards. The example of Merck & Co. is particularly relevant. See
supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text.
6o. See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MiCH. L. REV. 1257,
1277-79 (1976). Recent news stories have revealed the failure of the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration to police adequately the medical device industry. See, e.g., Barry Meier, FD.A. Had
Report of Short Circuit in Heart Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at Al (reporting that F.D.A. knew
of potentially fatal problem in Guidant Corp.'s implantable heart defibrillator three months before the
flaw caused the death of a college student implanted with the device).
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with the tremendous liability it now anticipates. But Justice O'Connor
did not suggest that punitive damages were being awarded in situations
when they should not; rather, she seemed primarily concerned about the6,
amounts awarded. It is as though, shocked senseless by headlines
announcing enormous verdicts, Justice O'Connor was unable to consider
the reasons and purpose for awarding large amounts of punitive
damages. The result is a muddied approach to determining whether such
awards are excessive.
B. PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS SUFFICE: PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE
INSURANCE CO. v. HASLIP
In its next case addressing punitive damages, the Court evaluated
the procedural protections employed in Alabama, in an opinion written
by Justice Blackmun and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Marshall and Stevens." In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip, an agent for two insurance companies defrauded Roosevelt City,
Alabama, when he sold the city health and life insurance for its
employees. Several city employees were left uninsured as a result of the
agent's fraud,63 and Pacific Mutual was held accountable for its agent's
conduct under the principle of respondeat superior.6
Noting that unlimited jury and judicial discretion "invite extreme
results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities," the Court nonetheless
affirmed an award that was "more than 4 times the amount of
compensatory damages [and] more than 200 times the out-of-pocket
expenses" of the plaintiff.' Although the amount "may be close to the
line" of being constitutionally excessive, the Court nonetheless found
that the defendant was afforded sufficient due process. Specifically, it
61. Justice O'Connor also neglected to discuss the possibility that the higher amounts may be due
to the failure of lower amounts to deter abhorrent conduct.
62. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I ('99'). Each of Justices Scalia and Kennedy
wrote a concurring opinion, while Justice O'Connor filed a lone dissenting opinion. Id. Justice Souter
did not participate in the case.
63. Id. at 4-5.
64. See id. at 12-15. "Alabama's common-law rule is that a corporation is liable for both
compensatory and punitive damages for the fraud of its employee effected within the scope of his
employment." Id. at 14. The Court explained the rationale for Alabama's long-standing common law
rule:
Imposing exemplary damages on the corporation when its agent commits intentional fraud
creates a strong incentive for vigilance by those in a position "to guard substantially against
the evil to be prevented." ... Imposing liability without independent fault deters fraud
more than a less stringent rule. It therefore rationally advances the State's goal. We cannot
say this is a violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process.
Id. (citation omitted). In contrast to Alabama law, California limits imposition of punitive damages on
employers under the theory of respondeat superior. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(b) (requiring that a
plaintiff seeking punitive damages show that the employer had "advance knowledge of the unfitness of
the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or
authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct").
65. Id. at i8, 23.
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was protected by jury instructions, as well as appellate and state supreme
court review according to established standards.66 In addition, the Court
found that the amount of the award was based on "objective criteria"
and the individual defendant could have faced imprisonment., Most
significantly in light of State Farm's proportionality rule, the Court
insisted that it could not "draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and constitutionally unacceptable that would
fit every case.'
Again, Justice O'Connor dissented. Unlike her opinion in Browning-
Ferris, however, Justice O'Connor focused in Haslip on the need for
better procedural protections. She asserted that "strong procedural
safeguards" are necessary because the "punitive character of punitive
damages means that there is more than just money at stake."' Her most
persuasive argument attacked the vagueness of the jury instructions and
the grant of complete discretion to the jury both in deciding whether to
award punitive damages and in setting the amount.7" Although she
applauded the standards the Alabama courts employed on appeal,
Justice O'Connor asserted that postverdict review "is incapable of curing
a grant of standardless discretion to the jury."'" She recommended
instead that the courts create meaningful jury instructions using the
discretionary "Green Oil" factors employed by Alabama's appellate
courts in reviewing punitive damages.72
66. Id. at 20 ("As long as the discretion is exercised within reasonable constraints, due process is
satisfied."). The jury was instructed about the discretionary nature of punitive damages and their
deterrent and punitive purpose, and they were told to consider the "character and degree of the wrong
as shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong." Id. at 6 nt. Notably, the Court
did not reject the use of the defendant's net worth in setting the amount of punitive damages. Rather it
cautioned that juries must consider other factors in addition to net worth so that "plaintiffs do not
enjoy a windfall because they have the good fortune to have a defendant with a deep pocket." Id. at
22.
67. Id. at 23.
68. Id. at i8.
69. Id. at 54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that "punitive damages are quasi-criminal
punishment" and that an award is accompanied by a "stigma").
70. Id. at 42-48. O'Connor complained that the jury instructions "defy rational implementation,"
which enables juries "to target unpopular defendants, penalize unorthodox or controversial views, and
redistribute wealth." Id. at 43.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 51-52. The Supreme Court of Alabama established the following "Green Oil
factors" to guide review of punitive damages awards:
(i) Punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm that is likely to
occur from the defendant's conduct as well as to the harm that actually has occurred. If the
actual or likely harm is slight, the damages should be relatively small. If grievous, the
damages should be much greater. (2) The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct should be considered. The duration of this conduct, the degree of the defendant's
awareness of any hazard which his conduct has caused or is likely to cause, and any
concealment or "cover-up" of that hazard, and the existence and frequency of similar past
conduct should all be relevant in determining this degree of reprehensibility. (3) If the
wrongful conduct was profitable to the defendant, the punitive damages should remove the
profit and should be in excess of the profit, so that the defendant recognizes a loss. (4) The
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Justice O'Connor also applauded legislative efforts to impose limits
on punitive damages, including the establishment of ranges for potential
awards.73 She advocated a "clear-and-convincing evidence" standard that
would limit "punitive damages to the more egregious cases."74 Notably
for California's interests and the proposals set forth later in this Note,
Justice O'Connor asserted that "concerns of federalism and judicial
restraint counsel that this Court should not legislate to the States which
particular method [of procedural reform] to adopt. I would thus leave it
to individual States to decide what method is most consistent with their
objectives."75
C. AFFIRMING DISPROPORTIONATE PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
RECOGNITION OF POTENTIAL HARM: TXO PRODUCTION CORP. V.
ALLIANCE RESOURCES CORP.
The defendant in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp. attempted to cast a cloud on title to property conveyed by the
plaintiff to the defendant and thereby cheat the plaintiff out of oil and
gas royalties. 76 The plurality opinion written for the Court by Justice
Stevens77 affirmed a punitive damages award of $io million where the
"actual" damages were only $i9,000 because of the egregious nature of
the defendant's conduct, which could have caused considerably more
damage had the defendant succeeded in its fraudulent endeavor. The
Court wrote: "It is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential
harm that the defendant's conduct would have caused to its intended
financial position of the defendant would be relevant. (5) All the costs of litigation should
be included, so as to encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to trial. (6) If criminal
sanctions have been imposed on the defendant for this conduct, this should be taken into
account in mitigation of the punitive damages award. (7) If there have been other civil
actions against the same defendant, based on the same conduct, this should be taken into
account in mitigation of the punitive damages award.
Id. The Green Oil factors got their name from Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989).
73. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 58.
75. Id.
76. See 509 U.S. 443,460-62 (1993). Justice Stevens summarized the case as follows:
On this record, the jury may reasonably have determined that petitioner set out on a
malicious and fraudulent course to win back, either in whole or in part, the lucrative stream
of royalties that it had ceded to Alliance. The punitive damages award in this case is
certainly large, but in light of the amount of money potentially at stake, the bad faith of
petitioner, the fact that the scheme employed in this case was part of a larger pattern of
fraud, trickery and deceit, and petitioner's wealth, we are not persuaded that the award was
so "grossly excessive" as to be beyond the power of the State to allow.
Id. at 462.
77. Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun. Justice Kennedy
joined the plurality opinion as to Parts I (factual recitation) and IV (addressing procedural issues and
affirming the award), and filed a separate concurring opinion explicitly rejecting the plurality's
argument that the Due Process Clause imposes substantive limits on punitive damages. Justice Scalia
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice O'Connor wrote
a dissenting opinion joined by Justice White and, in part, by Justice Souter.
March 2006]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded, as well as the possible harm to
other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior were not
deterred.'',8 In affirming the award, a plurality of the Court refused to
consider the defendant's attack on the jury instructions, which took into
account the defendant's wealth, because that challenge had not been
raised previously. 9 Nonetheless, the Court reiterated what it said in
Haslip: the "financial position of the defendant [is] one factor that could
be taken into account in assessing punitive damages." '
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy (who would later write for
the majority in State Farm) explicitly rejected the plurality's argument
that the Due Process Clause imposes substantive limits on the amount of
punitive damages that may be awarded.
I am not in full agreement, however, with the plurality's discussion of
the substantive requirements of the Due Process Clause in Parts II and
III, in which it concentrates on whether the punitive damages award
was "grossly excessive.'..... To ask whether a particular award of
punitive damages is grossly excessive begs the question: excessive in
relation to what? ... As I have suggested before, a more manageable
constitutional inquiry focuses not on the amount ol, money a jury awards
in a particular case but on its reasons for doing so.
Kennedy found the award in TXO justified by the defendant's malicious
conduct, which was "part of a pattern and practice by TXO to defraud
and coerce those in positions of unequal bargaining power.',8
Once again, Justice O'Connor dissented, bemoaning "what is rapidly
becoming an arbitrary and oppressive system.""8 As in Haslip, O'Connor
expended ink on the necessity of providing better guidance to juries.84
However, the bulk of the opinion addresses how punitive damages
should be calculated. Central to her analysis is that punishment be
proportionate to the offense.5  When punishment appears
disproportionate, "searching review" of the verdict is required to ensure
78. Id. at 460.
79. See id. at 464.
80. Id.
8i. Id. at 466-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 469.
83. Id. at 473 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice White joined Justice O'Connor's dissent, and
Justice Souter joined as to Parts II-B-2 (arguing that because the jury was not instructed to address
potential harm, it is an improper consideration for affirming the amount of punitive damages, id. at
489), 11-C (addressing possible jury bias against a wealthy out-of-state defendant, id. at 489-95), III
(asserting that the state appellate court's review of the punitive damages award was constitutionally
inadequate, id. at 495-500), and IV (complaining of increased size and frequency of punitive damages
awards and the need for better appellate review than the plurality opinion provides, id. at 500-o).
84. Justice O'Connor was particularly critical of the post hoc justification of the award; the issue
of potential harm was not presented to the jury, and thus justifying the award by reference to potential
harm was "little more than an after-the-fact rationalization invented by counsel to defend this startling
award on appeal." Id. at 484-85.
85. See id. at 478.
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that it is not the result of "bias, caprice, or passion., 86 In TXO, the ratio
between the punitive and compensatory damages was, in O'Connor's
mind, "dramatically irregular, if not shocking" and certainly enough to
"raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow."' O'Connor equated such
disproportionate punishment with jury bias.8
D. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AFFIRMED: BMW OFNORTH
AMERICA, INC. V. GORE
For the first time, the Court in 1996 invalidated a punitive damages
award for being "grossly excessive," in an opinion authored by Justice
Stevens and joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer.
89
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore involved the sale in Alabama of
new cars that had been repainted without disclosing the fact of such
repainting to the buyer. The jury awarded the plaintiff $4,000 in
compensatory damages (reflecting expert testimony supporting a ten
percent reduction in the value of the $40,000 car the plaintiff had
purchased) and $4 million in punitive damages, which the Alabama
Supreme Court, applying the Green Oil factors, reduced to $2 million.9'
Justice Kennedy joined Justice Stevens's opinion for the majority in
Gore-providing the crucial fifth vote-despite having, only three years
previously in TXO, explicitly rejected the notion that the Due Process
86. Id. at 481.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 475 (asserting "it cannot be denied that the lack of clear guidance heightens the risk that
arbitrariness, passion, or bias will replace dispassionate deliberation as the basis for the jury's
verdict"); id. at 489 ("[lIt seems quite likely that the jury in fact was unduly influenced by the fact that
TXO is a very large, out-of-state corporation.").
89. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (i996). Justice Scalia filed a dissenting
opinion, joined by Justice Thomas. Id.; see text accompanying notes 112-16. Justice Ginsburg also
dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Between the 1993 decision in TXO and the 1996 decision in Gore, the Court issued a decision in
Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, in which the Court declared unconstitutional an amendment to
Oregon's Constitution that prohibited judicial review of punitive damages awards unless there was no
evidence to support the award. 512 U.S. 415 (994). Justice Stevens wrote the opinion in Oberg, and
was joined by Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas. Justice Ginsburg,
in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, filed a dissenting opinion in which she argued that
since Oregon provided sufficient procedural protection in light of Haslip and TXO, the Court should
affirm. Id. at 437-44 (citations omitted).
9o. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 563-64, 567; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 626 (Ala.
1994). The plaintiff's complaint in Gore had sought "$500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages,
and costs." Gore, 517 U.S. at 563. On appeal, seeking to justify $4 million in punitive damages, the
plaintiff multiplied the $4,ooo reduction in value per vehicle times approximately 1,OOO repainted cars
sold nationally by BMW without disclosing the repainting. Id. at 564. Only fourteen of those cars were
sold in Alabama, id., which fact influenced the Alabama Supreme Court in reducing the punitive
damages by fifty percent. See Gore, 646 So. 2d at 625-26 ("If there have been other civil actions
against the same defendant, based on the same conduct, this fact should be taken into account in
mitigation of the punitive damages award."). In a case with facts almost identical to Gore, the jury




Clause set substantive limits on the amount that can be awarded."
The Gore opinion is curious for two additional reasons. One, it
expounded at length on a non-issue: the impropriety of imposing
punitive damages based on conduct in other jurisdictions.92 Second, the
"guideposts" that the majority used to conduct its excessiveness review
were adopted-without attribution-from Justice O'Connor's dissents in
Browning-Ferris and TXO. The three guideposts are: degree of
reprehensibility; ratio of punitive damages to "the actual harm inflicted
on the plaintiff"; and comparison to statutory criminal and civil sanctions
that could be imposed for like conduct.93
The Gore guideposts also represent a pared down version of
Alabama's seven Green Oil factors discussed approvingly by both the
majority and Justice O'Connor's dissent in Haslip.9 This fact is
noteworthy for three factors that were eliminated altogether without
explanation5 :
(I) "the profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the
desirability of removing that profit and of having the defendant also
sustain a loss";
96
(2) "the 'financial position' of the defendant";' and
(3) "all the costs of litigation," the recovery of which is meant "to
encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to trial."98
Had they been included, the three omitted factors would have better
ensured that the defendant was unable to absorb painlessly the punitive
damages award, and hence would have provided more effective
9
I. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 466-67 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring); supra notes 81-82 and
accompanying text.
92. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 568-74. It is a "false issue," as Justice Ginsburg's dissent rightly pointed
out, because the Alabama Supreme Court had already reduced the award in acknowledgement of the
jury's incorrect consideration of BMW's undisclosed sales of repainted cars in other states. Id. at 6o7
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Even Justice Stevens acknowledged as much. See id. at 573 ("The Alabama
Supreme Court therefore properly eschewed reliance on BMW's out-of-state conduct and based its
remitted award solely on conduct that occurred within Alabama." (citation omitted)).
93. Id. at 574-83. O'Connor suggested the first and third guideposts in Browning-Ferris, and the
second guidepost in TXO. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
300-01 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); TXO, 509 U.S. at 478
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22, 51-52 (I99I); see also supra note 72.
95. One of the Green Oil factors is the "relationship between the punitive damages award and the
harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred."
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added). Although the Court in State Farm referred to this factor-
including the reference to potential harm-it essentially subsumed the factor in its proportionality
rule. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418, 424-25 (2003); see also infra
Part II.
96. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22. Justice Breyer acknowledged that this factor has the potential "to limit
awards to a fixed, rational amount." Gore, 517 U.S. at 591 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
97. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 22,51.
[Vol. 57:827
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CALIFORNIA
deterrence than the three factors the Court retained. Of the three Gore
guideposts-reprehensibility, proportionality, and comparison to
statutory sanctions-the latter two serve to constrain the amount of
punitive damages, and none actually serves a deterrence purpose. The
Court's cherrypicking of the Gore guideposts exemplifies the Court's
move away from punitive damages that truly aim to deter persons from
engaging in tortious conduct."
The Gore Court's discussion of reprehensibility provides useful
guidance about the types of conduct that merit "significant" punitive
damages awards."0 Harm that is "purely economic in nature" is not
sufficiently reprehensible unless it affects "performance or safety
features"; the conduct otherwise evinces an "indifference to or reckless
disregard for the health and safety of others"; or the conduct is
intentional and targets the "financially vulnerable .... It is unclear
whether the concern for the financially vulnerable includes Justice
Kennedy's prior approval in TXO of imposing greater punitive damages
when a defendant takes advantage of unequal bargaining power.' 2 In
keeping with the Court's criminal jurisprudence, repeat offenders
deserve greater punishment.' 3 Where there are "deliberate false
99. See Anthony Geraci, Gore's Metamorphosis in State Farm v. Campbell: When Guideposts
Make a Detour, ST. THOMAS L. REV. I, 19-22 (2004) (State Farm eliminated the deterrence purpose of
punitive damages so that "[c]orporations are now effectively able to make a cost-benefit analysis on
every decision and can now effectively decide whether or not to violate the law."). On remand, the
Alabama Supreme Court held that a new trial would be held unless Gore accepted a remittitur of
punitive damages to $50,ooo. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 626 (Ala. 1997). In a
concurring opinion, Alabama Supreme Court Justice Cook asserted that the proper amount of
punitive damages should have been $56,ooo, representing fourteen (the number of repainted cars sold
in Alabama) times $4,000 (the diminished value per vehicle). Id. at 516 (Cook, J., concurring). One
justice on the Alabama Supreme Court wrote a special concurrence solely to note his opinion that "the
deterrent effect of the original award, which changed BMW's national policy in a way that benefited
purchasers of its automobiles, has been unduly minimized as this case has proceeded through
successive stages of review." Id. (Almon, J., concurring).
ioo. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 576. In State Farm, Justice Kennedy referred to these elements as
helping merely to sustain a punitive damages award-rather than supporting a significant punitive
damages award. Compare id. (noting the absence of "aggravating factors associated with particularly
reprehensible conduct" that "justify a significant sanction in addition to compensatory damages"),
with State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 ("The existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor of a
plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of them
renders any award suspect."). In the two opinions the same aggravating factors are described, but their
function shifts from supporting a significant punitive damages award to merely helping support an
award (but not being sufficient alone to sustain an award).
ioi. Gore, 517 U.S. at 576.
102. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
103. See Gore, 5 17 U.S. at 576-77 ("Certainly, evidence that a defendant has repeatedly engaged in
prohibited conduct while knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful would provide relevant support
for an argument that strong medicine is required to cure the defendant's disrespect for the law.").
However, the Court greatly diminishes this criterion by subsuming it under its "reprehensibility"
analysis. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 427. In addition, it greatly reduces the impact of repeat conduct by
narrowly defining what constitutes similar conduct. See id. at 437-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence of
improper motive, such as were present in Haslip and TXO," greater
punishment is warranted.'" The Court distinguished the more
reprehensible "deliberate false statement" from the less serious
"omission of a material fact ... particularly when there is a good-faith
basis for believing that no duty to disclose exists."' 5 The threat of
unrealized but potential harm from the defendant's conduct may be
considered to augment an award.' 6 Furthermore, where compensatory
damages are low but the conduct is "particularly egregious," or where
the injury is difficult to quantify, a higher proportion of punitive damages
relative to compensatory damages may be warranted.'" Higher punitive
damages are also merited where a defendant had notice that its conduct
could result in severe punishment. 8
In a concurring opinion joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter,
Justice Breyer addressed the Green Oil factors ignored by the majority
opinion. In particular, Justice Breyer acknowledged the relevance of the
defendant's wealth for ensuring that a "poor person" is not punished
more severely than a "wealthy one" by a "fixed dollar award."'" But he
also expressed concern for the possibility that considerations of the
defendant's wealth could "provide an open-ended basis for inflating
awards when the defendant is wealthy .... However, he argued, "[t]hat
fact does not make its use unlawful or inappropriate; it simply means that
[the defendant's wealth] cannot make up for the failure of other factors,
such as 'reprehensibility,' to constrain significantly an award that
purports to punish a defendant's conduct .... By implication, it seems
that Justice Breyer would permit considerations of the defendant's
io4. Gore, 517 U.S. at 579.
105. This distinction is particularly important in Gore, because the defendant's nondisclosure
policy was in keeping with the most stringent state statutory requirement. See id. at 565. For example,
the State of California mandates disclosure of repairs that cost three percent or more of the retail price
of the vehicle. Id. at 578 (citing CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. § 9990 (West Supp. 1996)). Thus, a $6oo repair
on a $40,000 car (as was the case in Gore) would not require disclosure in California or in any other
state that similarly defines "materiality." The jury in Gore based its verdict on Alabama's codified
common law cause of action for fraud, which at the time did not define "materiality." Id. at 563 n.3. In
1993 after the jury verdict in Gore, Alabama's legislature enacted a law requiring disclosure of
material repairs, which it defined as repairs costing in excess of the greater of $500 of 3% of the
manufacturer's suggested retail price for the automobile. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d
619, 623 (Ala. 1994) (citing ALA. CODE § 8-19-5 (993)).
Io6. See id. at 581-82. The California Supreme Court elaborated on this point in Simon v. San
Paolo Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63 (Cal. 2005). See infra Part IV.A.2.
xo7. Gore, 517 U.S. at 582.
io8. See id. at 584.
to9. Id. at 591.
IIo. Id.
i i i. Id. Compare this statement to the Court's assertion in State Farm: "The wealth of a defendant
cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,427 (2003).
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wealth only to reduce a punitive damages award but not to ensure that
the amount has sufficient sting so as not to go unnoticed.
Justice Scalia wrote a bristling dissent in Gore, joined by Justice
Thomas, in whith he catalogued the many faults of the majority opinion's
"new federal law of damages ..... Like Justice Ginsburg, who wrote a
separate dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia
asserted that the substantive limits imposed by the Court constitute "an
incursion into the province of state governments."'"3 In Justice Scalia's
view, the Court improperly substituted its perspective for that of the
jury."4 The bulk of Justice Scalia's dissent faulted the majority for its
weak legal precedent in establishing a substantive due process right to
punitive damages that are "fair":
There is no precedential warrant for giving our judgment priority over
the judgment of state courts and juries on this matter. The only support
for the Court's position is to be found in a handful of errant federal
cases, bunched within a few years of one other, which invented the
notion that an unfairly severe civil sanction amounts to a violation of
constitutional liberties.... Although they are our precedents, they are
themselves too shallowly rooted to justify the Court's recent
undertaking. "'
In short, Justice Scalia's argument boils down to his belief that "there is
no federal guarantee a damages award actually be reasonable."'"6
II. STATE FARM'S PUNITIVE DAMAGES JURISPRUDENCE
Affirming his recent embrace of substantive due process limits on
punitive damages, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court in
State Farm v. Campbell, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and Breyer."' Justice Kennedy's presentation
112. Gore, 517 U.S. at 6o5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 598; see also id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court, I am convinced,
unnecessarily and unwisely ventures into territory traditionally within the States' domain ... .
114. Justice Scalia wrote:
At the time of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was well understood that
punitive damages represent the assessment by the jury, as the voice of the community, of
the measure of punishment the defendant deserved.... Today's decision, though dressed
up as a legal opinion, is really no more than a disagreement with the community's sense of
indignation or outrage expressed in the punitive award of the Alabama jury, as reduced by
the State Supreme Court.
Id. at 6oo (Scalia, J., dissenting).
I15. Id. at 6oo--ox.
116. Id. at 599.
117. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 4o8, 411 (2003); see notes 81-82, 91 and
accompanying text (describing Justice Kennedy's change of position regarding substantive due process
limits on punitive damages). Chief Justice Rehnquist's vote in State Farm also involved a curious
change of position. In Gore, Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion,
which argued that the Court, by overturning the award, intruded "into an area dominantly of state
concern." BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 6o7 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Since
joining the Court, Justice Ginsburg has consistently dissented in the Court's punitive damages cases,
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of the facts in his opinion for the Court in State Farm evinces a distaste
for undeserving plaintiffs receiving a windfall in punitive damages."' The
plaintiffs prevailed in a bad faith insurance case against State Farm, but
the incident that led to the action involved a reckless disregard for others
by the plaintiff, Curtis Campbell. While driving on a two-lane highway in
Utah, Campbell tried to pass six vans and caused head-on collision with a
car coming from the opposite direction.' 9 The death of one driver and
permanent disability of another resulted. As the Court noted, "[t]he
Campbells escaped unscathed."'..
The Campbells filed a bad faith insurance action because State Farm
refused to settle Campbell's accident case within the $50,000 policy limit.
In the accident case, State Farm contested Campbell's liability, and,
when a jury found Campbell liable for $136,ooo beyond his policy limit,
State Farm initially refused to pay the excess. 2 ' The jury in the bad faith
action awarded the Campbells "$2.6 million in compensatory damages
and $145 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $I
million and $25 million, respectively .... . State Farm appealed the
judgment, and the Utah Supreme Court applied the Gore guideposts-
reprehensibility, proportionality, and comparison to other penalties-
which ironically resulted in reinstatement of the full $145 million in
punitive damages. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the award,
finding that its own application of the Gore guideposts "likely would
justify a punitive damages award at or near the amount of compensatory
and illogically, Justice Rehnquist has joined her half the time. For example, in Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg, Justice Ginsburg insisted that the Court defer to the State of Oregon and permit it to limit
judicial review of punitive damages awards. 512 U.S. 415, 451 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined that opinion. But in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not join Justice Ginsburg's dissent; instead, he joined the majority in
holding that punitive damages awards be reviewed de novo. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). Inexplicably, he was
willing to defer to the States in Oberg, but when faced with the extent of review of State courts'
awards, he chose de novo rather than the prior deference standard. Kennedy's and Rehnquist's
waffling positions in these cases underscore the difficulty the Court has had in arriving at, and
articulating, meaningful standards for awarding punitive damages.
i18. The procedural history of State Farm is somewhat complicated and need not be detailed here.
Although Campbell was the plaintiff in the bad faith insurance action against State Farm, ninety
percent of the damages recovered in State Farm were to be paid to Campbell's victims because of a
settlement reached in the case pertaining to the car accident. See id. at 413-14.
I19. Id. at 412.
i2o. Id. at 413.
121. The Court is vague as to the timeline of the matter. The accident occurred in 1981; a verdict in
the accident case was issued at some point prior to or during 1984; the appeal was pending in 1984, at
which point the settlement agreement was reached by Campbell and the parties to the accident suit,
and the decision to pursue the bad faith insurance action was reached; in 1989, the appeal was denied;
and sometime thereafter State Farm paid the full judgment. See id. at 413-14. The Court describes the
Campbell's case against State Farm as amounting to "a year and a half of emotional distress." Id. at
426. It is unclear how that period is calculated.
122. Id. at 415.
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damages."'23 The Court said a lower amount was justified in large part
because "of the substantial compensatory damages awarded (a portion of
which contained a punitive element).'
2 4
A. THE FIRST GORE GUIDEPOST: REPREHENSIBILITY
While Justice Kennedy's discussion of reprehensibility commenced
with a restatement of the "aggravating factors" described in Gore,' 5 and
an acknowledgment that State Farm's conduct "merits no praise, ''.26 it
faulted the Utah court's analysis of evidentiary issues. Specifically, the
Utah court erred in considering evidence of State Farm's national
policies of underpaying claims, which the Supreme Court deemed
impermissible "dissimilar and out-of-state conduct."'' 7 Justice Kennedy
repeated what the Court asserted in Gore: "A State cannot punish a
defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred. '' 2'
Nor may a State punish a defendant for illegal conduct that took place
outside the state. 2 9
The Court's pronouncements on evidence of the defendant's other
acts show that plaintiffs must walk a fine line. A plaintiff may still present
evidence of acts committed by a defendant in other states if those acts
"have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff."'3 However,
in such a case, the jury must be instructed not to use that evidence to
punish the defendant for conduct directed at persons other than the
plaintiff. "A defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed
the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business.' 3 '
Punishing a defendant for conduct committed against others "creates the
possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct.' 32
Nevertheless, a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first-
time offender so long as "the conduct in question replicates the prior
transgressions."'33 We are left with a narrow middle ground: Similar act
evidence is relevant to the issue of reprehensibility, but it cannot be used
to augment punitive damages except where it shows the defendant to be
123. Id. at 429.
124- Id.
125. See supra text accompanying notes Ioo-o8.
126. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419.
127. Id. at 420.
128. Id. at 421 (citations omitted).
129. See id. at 421.
130. Id. at 422.
131. Id. at 423.
132. Id. The Court's concern with multiple punishment is inconsistent with its criminal punishment
jurisprudence. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
133. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423 (citation omitted). The Court's requirement of similar conduct for
punishing a recidivist represents a significant departure from its criminal jurisprudence, but the Court
provides no rationale for that difference. The reference to similar past conduct derives from the Green
Oil factors established by Alabama's Supreme Court. See supra note 72.
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a recidivist. The chief problem with the majority's formulation as applied
in State Farm is that it very narrowly construed what constitutes "similar"
conduct. "
B. THE SECOND GORE GUIDEPOST: PROPORTIONALITY
The most discussed part of the State Farm opinion concerns the
second Gore guidepost: the ratio between the actual or potential harm
suffered and the amount of punitive damages awarded.'35 In a textbook
illustration of equivocation, the Court repeatedly alternated between
rejecting and asserting specific numerical ratios. It began by rejecting the
imposition of a "bright-line ratio" or "simple mathematical formula."'' 6 It
followed this rejection with an assertion, in heavily qualified language, of
specific ratios. For example, it stated that "few awards exceeding a
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process."'37 It reminded us that Haslip
"concluded that an award of more than four times the amount of
compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional
impropriety."318 Then the Court returned to qualifying its
pronouncements: "[T]hese ratios are not binding, they are instructive.
They demonstrate what should be obvious: Single-digit multipliers are
more likely to comport with due process."'39
After setting forth the foregoing ballpark figures, the Court
announced that the ratio in State Farm, 145-to-1, raises a "presumption"
of unconstitutionality." ° The use of the word "presumption" suggests
that, in the proper case, such a ratio may be acceptable so long as there is
sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption. After all, the Court
affirmed higher ratios in earlier cases. In Browning-Ferris, the Court
affirmed a 1 17-to-i ratio; in TXO, the approved ratio was 526 to I; and in
Haslip, the punitive damages were four times compensatory damages
and two hundred times the plaintiff's expenses.'4 ' The imprecise and
134. Justice Ginsburg addressed this problem in her dissent. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 437-38
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
135. See Birnbaum & Dunham, supra note 21, at 179 ("Ratio is the Campbell guidepost that has
received the most comprehensive discussion in the case law.").
136. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424-25.
137. Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
138. Id.; see also supra note i8.
139. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 426.
141. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ($6 million in punitive damages and $5 1,ooo
in compensatory damages); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (99) ("Although there is
controversy about the matter, it is probable that the general verdict for respondent Haslip contained a
punitive damages component of not less than $84o,ooo. In Haslip's counsel's argument to the jury,
compensatory damages of $200,ooo... were requested."); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res, Corp.,
509 U.S. 443, 446, 453 (1993) ($io million in punitive damages and $19,ooo in compensatory damages).
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equivocal language used in State Farm suggests that those cases remain
good law; certainly State Farm does not criticize or overrule them. Thus,
if presented with a case of similar evidentiary weight as TXO or
Browning-Ferris, where the defendant clearly engaged in intentionally
malicious conduct that could never be equated with an exercise in
business judgment," an award significantly higher than a single-digit
ratio may pass muster.'43 As the Court acknowledged, "because there are
no rigid benchmarks... ratios greater than those we have previously
upheld may comport with due process where 'a particularly egregious act
has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. '' ' .4
The Court's analysis of the harm that State Farm caused the
Campbells suggests that where compensatory damages primarily
compensate for emotional distress, punitive damages will be subject to
stricter review and, hence, the strong potential for reduction. The Court
wrote that the Campbells were paid "$I million for a year and a half of
emotional distress."'45 Because the Campbells suffered no physical
injuries and "only minor economic injuries," the Court felt it was likely
that the compensatory award already included a punitive element.' 46
Thus, the punitive damages award was, in essence, double recovery.
"Much of the distress was caused by the outrage and humiliation the
Campbells suffered at the actions of their insurer; and it is a major role of
punitive damages to condemn such conduct. Compensatory damages,
however, already contain this punitive element."'47  The Court's
conclusion that the Campbell's compensatory damages award included a
punitive element implies that damages paid for emotional distress claims
for purely economic injury are inherently punitive rather than
compensatory. Thus, to avoid double recovery and overcompensation,
142. The Court's finding that State Farm merely made a bad business decision when it chose not to
settle Campbell's accident suit for $50,000 suggests that the Court was not willing to find State Farm's
conduct as reprehensible as that of TXO or Browning-Ferris, despite that in both TXO and Browning-
Ferris, the plaintiffs were relatively sophisticated business entities.
143. Accord Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3 d 672 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.)
(rejecting the defendant's argument that State Farm required reduction of punitive damages to no
more than four times compensatory damages; asserting that State Farm establishes a mere presumption
against punitive damages that bear a high ratio to compensatory damages; and affirming punitive
damages more than 37 times compensatory damages).
144. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. It is worth noting that in the case often cited as the first modern
case imposing punitive damages, Huckle v. Money, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was
fourteen to one. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 274 n.2o (citing Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng.
Rep. 768 (K.B.)). The Court noted that the total award was three hundred pounds where the injury to
the plaintiff was valued at twenty pounds; thus punitive or "exemplary" damages would be two
hundred eighty pounds and compensatory damages twenty pounds, a ratio of fourteen to one.
145. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426.
146. Id. It is difficult to believe the Court did not also consider the fact that Curtis Campbell
himself caused great harm to others with his reckless driving. See supra text accompanying notes i 19-
147. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426 (internal citation omitted).
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the Court found it necessary to reject the "massive award.'
I 4
8
The Court disapproved the Utah Supreme Court's reliance on State
Farm's wealth as a factor in awarding punitive damages, but it did not
suggest how, if ever, a defendant's wealth might be applicable. Nor did it
hold that consideration of wealth is never permissible. Rather, the Court
merely asserted that wealth "cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional
punitive damages award.' 49 It seems that if a plaintiff could show a
correlation between a defendant's wealth and the harm caused by the
defendant's conduct (perhaps by showing profits gained or costs avoided
by engaging in the tortious conduct, or abuse of greater economic
bargaining power), then some measure of the defendant's financial
condition could be relevant.'50 Certainly this was the approach approved
of by the plurality opinion in TXO penned by Justice Stevens and joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun. The jury instructions
in that case explained that "the law recognizes that to in fact deter such
conduct may require a larger fine upon one of large means than it would
upon one of ordinary means under the same or similar circumstances.","
Perhaps the only way to understand the Court's analysis in State Farm is
to recognize that the Court did not view State Farm's conduct as
especially egregious.'52 As a result, the Court did not think the case
merited substantial punitive damages, and thus any reference to the
defendant's wealth was irrelevant because it "cannot justify an otherwise
unconstitutional" award.'53
In TXO, Justice O'Connor cautioned that proportionality must be
based on "objective criteria" because "[o]ne judge's excess very well may
be another's moderation." ' 4 But in focusing on the proportion of
punitive to compensatory damages without regard to principles of
disgorgement or abuse of unequal bargaining power, the Court seemed
to view compensatory damages as the only "objective criteria" worth
considering. One problem with the proportionality rule is that it assumes
that compensatory damages are an objective measure of the defendant's
tortious conduct. Such an approach implies that a defendant who
148. Id. In its analysis of harm, the Court did not address the issue of potential harm.
149. Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
15o. The Court provided this rather unhelpful sentence: "Here the argument that State Farm will
be punished in only the rare case, coupled with reference to its assets (which, of course, are what other
insured parties in Utah and other States must rely upon for payment of claims) had little to do with the
actual harm sustained by the Campbells." Id.
151. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,463 n.29 (1993).
152. This is precisely the problem addressed by Justice Scalia's dissent in Gore: the Court
substitutes its judgment for that of the jury, who are supposed to represent the moral outrage of the
community, in violation of the Seventh Amendment. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
6oo (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 427.
154. TXO. 509 U.S. at 48o-8I.
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defrauds an individual of his entire but meager life savings is less
deserving of punishment than one who embezzles millions of dollars
from a corporation with billions of dollars in assets. That corporation is
not objectively harmed more than the individual, yet the proportionality
rule dictates that the corporation receive greater punitive damages than
the individual of lesser means. If punitive damages are to punish a
defendant because of egregious conduct, then the level of harm caused
should not be the sole measure of punishment. To analogize to criminal
law, as Justice O'Connor frequently did in this context, treating harm
(e.g., death) as a measure of conduct (killing) would result in identical
punishment for manslaughter and first degree murder. While the amount
of harm caused should certainly be taken into consideration, it is
important to recognize that it is not an accurate measure of the
egregiousness of a defendant's tortious conduct. This problem lies at the
heart of the Court's proportionality rule.
C. THE THIRD GORE GUIDEPOST: OTHER SANCTIONS
The Court gave short shrift to the third guidepost-"the disparity
between the punitive damages award and the 'civil penalties authorized
or imposed in comparable cases.""55 Although the Utah court had
referred to the potential for criminal sanctions, the Court disregarded
that fact because it depends on "the broad fraudulent scheme drawn
from evidence of out-of-state and dissimilar conduct."'' 6 The Court also
ignored Utah's ability to revoke State Farm's business license or to
require disgorgement of profits. Such sanctions were too "speculative"
for the Court and were based on State Farm's nationwide practice of
refusing to pay claims.'57 While the Court deflated the impact that the
availability of criminal sanctions may have on the determination of
punitive damages in this case, it nonetheless made assertions that imply
that, with the proper procedural protections, a state could impose
significant punitive damages for conduct that is codified as criminal.'5
155. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428 (citation omitted). Proponents of punitive damages reform have
criticized courts' lack of proper attention to the third guidepost. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Selective
Due Process: The United States Supreme Court Has Said That Punitive Damages Awards Must Be
Reviewed for Excessiveness, but Many Courts Are Failing to Follow the Letter and Spirit of the Law, 82
OR. L. REV. 33,51-57 (2003).
I56. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428.
157. See id.
I58. The State Farm Court wrote:
The existence of a criminal penalty does have bearing on the seriousness with which a State
views the wrongful action. When used to determine the dollar amount of the award,
however, the criminal penalty has less utility. Great care must be taken to avoid use of the
civil process to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed only after the heightened
protections of a criminal trial have been observed, including, of course, its higher standards
of proof. Punitive damages are not a substitute for the criminal process, and the remote
possibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a punitive damages award.
Id.; see also Thomas M. Melsheimer & Steven H. Stodghill, Due Process and Punitive Damages:
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When compared to its deferential attitude toward states' imposition
of punishment in criminal cases," 9 the U.S. Supreme Court's setting of
substantive limits to punitive damages awards seems completely
misguided. For example, as Professor Erwin Chemerinsky and others
have pointed out, the disproportionate punishment in criminal cases
compared to civil cases is particularly stark in light of the Court's
approval of California's three strikes law in two cases decided only a
month before the Court decided State Farm.'6° Professor Chemerinsky
wrote:
In BMW and State Farm, the Court emphasized the need to consider
the ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages. Yet, in
Ewing and Andrade, the Court paid absolutely no attention to the ratio
between the penalty enhancement and the punishment that otherwise
would have been imposed. For example, in Andrade, the maximum
punishment for two counts of petty theft with a prior is three years,
eight months in prison, but Andrade received a sentence of life
imprisonment with no possibility of parole for fifty years. This is a ratio
of 16:i, larger than the single digits that the Court endorsed in punitive
damages cases in State Farm.
6'
Providing Meaningful Guidance to the Jury, 47 SMU L. REV. 329 (I994).
What the Court, along with many critics of the current system, has simply ignored is that to
the extent there exists a problem of constitutional dimensions in the punitive damages
system, it is a problem of procedural due process. Punitive damages awards should not be
suspect solely because of the size of the award. Under the right circumstances, punitive
damages in the millions or tens of millions could be appropriate. Consequently, substantive
limits on such awards are not sensible and are reminiscent of the Court's jurisprudence in
the Lochner era. Nonetheless, punitive damages remain suspect in our current system
because of the clumsy, half-in-the-dark process that we foist upon jurors in determining an
appropriate award.
Id. at 336 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (9o5)).
159. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. i (2003) (affirming sentence of twenty-five years with
no possibility for parole for defendant's third felony conviction involving the theft of three golf clubs,
and asserting that "sentence is justified by the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and
deterring recidivist felons"); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66, 77 (2003) (affirming two consecutive
twenty-five year terms without possibility of parole for two separate incidents of theft of videotapes,
worth a total of approximately $15o from two Kmart stores).
i6o. Ewing, 538 U.S. is; Andrade, 538 U.S. 63; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and
Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court has developed inconsistent
approaches to the "four major types of punishments that courts can impose: death sentences,
imprisonment, fines, and punitive damages"). Chemerinsky explained that the U.S. Supreme Court
requires proportionality analysis when reviewing death penalty and punitive damages cases, but not in
evaluating the length of prison sentences. "Indeed, the Court's decisions provide that taking away too
much money is unconstitutional, but too many years in prison is not." Id. at io62. Chemerinsky also
noted that the Court defers to state legislatures when evaluating prison sentences but not when
evaluating punitive damages. Chemerinsky also argued that there is greater historical support for
proportionality analysis in prison sentences than in punitive damages awards. Id. at lO65.
Rachel A. Van Cleave has noted the Court's astonishing disproportionality in applying property
forfeiture laws: "The sale of cocaine worth $25o resulted in the forfeiture of an apartment worth
$14O,OOO in one case." Rachel A. Van Cleave, "Death is Different," Is Money Different? Criminal
Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages- Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing
Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 217, 219 (2003).
161. Chemerinsky, supra note i6o, at lo6i (discussing Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66, and Ewing, 538 U.S.
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How can the same Constitution that permits states to impose the
death penalty restrict punitive damages sanctions imposed on
intentionally willful or recklessly indifferent tortious conduct? '62 The
Court has expressed concern about arbitrary awards imposed without the
protections of due process, but the proportionality rule is no less
arbitrary than leaving the decision to the discretion of a jury and trial
court judge. Even worse, the Court's methodology bears no relation to
the state's legitimate interest in deterring wrongdoing. It is possible to
recognize the need for procedural protections without completely
undermining the purpose of punitive damages awards, as California's
punitive damages jurisprudence demonstrates.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CALIFORNIA
A. REQUIREMENTS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AT TRIAL
Awards of punitive damages have long been permitted in
California.' 63  The California Code contains extensive provisions
regarding punitive damages 6' It has been suggested that punitive
damages are difficult to obtain in California because of statutory
limitations.' 6' For example, California plaintiffs may not seek punitive
damages in actions "arising from contract" unless a tort is alleged, such
as breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'66 California also
at 29).
162. How can a $550,000 fine for a briefly bared breast during the Super Bowl be permissible while
a $1.7 million punitive damages award for fraud is deemed constitutionally excessive? See Geraldine
Fabrikant, CBS Fined Over Super Bowl Halftime Incident, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at CI (reporting
FCC fine); Textron Fin. Corp. v. Nat'l Union Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Penn., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586 (Ct.
App. 2004) (reducing from $1.7 million to $36o,ooo the punitive damages awarded against an
insurance company that engaged in fraud). Those who support the FCC's crackdown contend such
fines affirm and uphold community values. One commissioner of the FCC complained the fine was too
low. "I find today's remedy totally inadequate," he wrote. "After all the bold talk, it's a slap on the
wrist that can be paid with just seven and a half seconds of Super Bowl ad time." Fabrikant, supra. In a
similar vein, punitive damages awards based on a defendant's wealth seek to ensure that parties do not
engage in-or profit from-conduct that disrupts the social order. See Marc Galanter & David Luban,
Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1430, 1436-38 (1993).
163. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 380 (Ct. App. 1981) (noting that
punitive damages were permitted under "the common law of this state long before the Civil Code was
adopted" and were enacted into statute in 1872 (citations omitted)).
164. See, e.g., LEVINE ET AL., supra note 23, at 156-57; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3294, 3295 (Deering
2005); see also CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 425.10, 425.11. For example, a plaintiff may not plead a
specified amount of punitive damages. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(e).
165. See LEVINE ET AL., supra note 23, at 156.
166. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(a) ("In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for
the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant."). Thus an insured may bring action
against an insurance company even though the action arises from a contractual relationship. See, e.g.,
Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980 (Cal. 1978). For a persuasive argument that punitive damages
should be permitted for willful breaches of contract, including both opportunistic and efficient
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limits the imposition of punitive damages on employers for the conduct
of an employee,'67 and plaintiffs alleging medical malpractice must obtain
court approval before seeking punitive damages.' ts Several statutes also
cap the amount of punitive damages that may be awarded for specific
causes of action.' 69 In contrast, Justice O'Connor cited a 1987 study that
found that "punitive damages were assessed against one of every ten
defendants who were found liable for compensatory damages in
California.""'7 Regardless, California is one state where punitive damages
breaches, see William S. Dodge, The Case For Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629
('999).
Justice O'Connor attributed much of the increase in punitive damages awards to a change in the
substantive law that permits such awards in actions for bad faith breach of contract. See Pac. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. s, 61 (I991) (citing RAND INsTrruTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PuNrrTvE
DAMAGES-EMPIRICAL FINDINGS iii (1987)). Jane Mallor and Barry Roberts explain:
Several writers have suggested that the trend toward imposing punitive damages in contract
cases reflects courts' efforts to protect vulnerable parties against abuse of bargaining power
by dominant parties.... If a breaching party is unable to advance some reasonable basis in
law or in fact for failing to perform contractual obligations, an inference of bad faith is
unavoidable. When this bad faith is coupled with disparity in bargaining power, the sanction
of punitive damages is appropriate.
Mallor & Roberts, Principled Approach, supra note 59, at 662-63 (citations omitted).
167. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(b) (requiring that a plaintiff seeking punitive damages show that
the employer had "advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with
a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct").
168. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 425.13(a).
t69. Then California Supreme Court Justice Janice Rogers Brown noted:
In more than 30 instances, the Legislature has provided for double or treble damages as a
punishment for wrongful acts. (See, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17537.4 [unlawful
advertising], 21140.4 [violations of regulations governing fuel franchises]; Civ. Code,
§ 1812.9 [willful violation of laws governing retail installment sales], 1947.10 [evictions
based on fraudulent intent to occupy], 3345 [unfair or deceptive practices against senior
citizens or disabled persons]; Lab. Code, § 206 [failure to pay certain wages].)
Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 993 P.2d 388, 401 (Cal. 2000).
170. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 61 (citing RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES-
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS iii (1987)). A study published in 1997 found that punitive damages are awarded in
only three percent of jury trials and in six percent of jury trials where the plaintiff prevailed. See
Yeazell, supra note 18, at 2037 (citing Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive
Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 634 (1997)). Of course, given the number of cases that never make it
to trial, reciting the percentage of jury verdicts that include punitive damages does not give an accurate
picture of the frequency of punitive damages. Such awards might be embedded in settlements and may
be awarded in arbitration.
Furthermore, while Justice O'Connor cited the number to support her assertion that punitive
damages awards are skyrocketing (a fact that has been much disputed, see supra note 54), the figure
standing alone is ultimately meaningless. It does not tell us whether that percentage is high relative to
other states or the nation as a whole. It does not indicate whether it is historically high, and even if it
were, that fact does not necessarily support the implication that punitive damages are running wild in
California. It may simply reflect a reality in which the community is less willing to turn a blind eye to
tortfeasors' willful conduct; it may reflect an increasing consensus that persons should not be
permitted to purchase the right to cause harm to others.
The American Bar Association has determined that while "punitive damages awards have grown
in frequency and size over the past twenty-five years, the bulk of this growth has been in cases of
intentional torts, unfair business practices, and contractual bad faith. The punitive damages picture in
personal injury cases has changed very little in 25 years." Melsheimer & Stodghill, supra note 158, at
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jurisprudence is a far cry from the unbounded discretion of which the
U.S. Supreme Court has complained.'
i. Specific Intent Required to Award Punitive Damages in
California
California punitive damages law places special emphasis on the
mental state of the defendant, who must act with specific intent.'72 To
recover punitive damages in California, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant "has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice."'7 3 Each of
those terms is statutorily defined.'74 For example, "malice" is defined as
conduct intended to cause injury or, alternatively, despicable conduct that
willfully and consciously disregards the rights or safety of others.' 5
For example, to justify a punitive damages award in Neal v. Farmer's
Insurance Exchange, it was not enough to show that the defendant
insurance company breached its "duty to deal reasonably and in good
faith with its insured.' ', 6 Rather, the plaintiff had to prove that the
defendant "acted with the quality of intent that is requisite to an award
of punitive damages."'77 The plaintiff proved that intent by presenting
evidence that included a claims manual instructing insurance agents how
to capitalize on the vulnerability of the insured."" The plaintiff in Neal
332. Melsheimer and Stodghill argue that anecdotal evidence of skyrocketing punitive damages awards
disregards the fact that many punitive damage awards are "substantially reduced or overturned on
appeal." Id.
17t. See, e.g., Haslip, 499 U.S. at I8 (noting that "unlimited jury discretion-or unlimited judicial
discretion for that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's
constitutional sensibilities"); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
281 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing the jury instructions as "scarcely better than no
guidance at all").
172. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 986 (Cal. 1978) (citations omitted). This approach is
in keeping with the longstanding history of punitive damages, which were initially imposed only for
intentional torts. Schwartz & Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform, supra note 16, at 1369.
173. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a).
174. "'Malice' means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or
despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(c)(1).
"'Oppression' means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person's rights." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c)(2) (emphasis added).
"Oppression carries with it an attitudinal element, for it implies knowledge of power over a weaker
party and use of that power as leverage to gain one's own ends." Mallor & Roberts, Principled
Approach, supra note 59, at 653.
"'Fraud' means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known
to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of
property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c)(3) (emphasis added).
175. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c) (emphasis added).
176. Neal, 582 P.2d at 986.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 987. The manual stated: "It is important for the claims representative to learn how to
sense opportune times for settlement.... Such things as a marriage or death in the family, the
purchase of a home or automobile will present the ordinary claimant with a financial situation which
will suggest to him the advisability of getting his money out of his claim." Id. at 987 n.8. The plaintiff in
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had informed her agent that because she was suffering from cancer, she
was eager to receive payment of the amount owed under her insurance
contract."7 As instructed by the claims manual, the defendant's agent
pounced on this opportunity and tried to force the insured to accept a
much lower amount."' The court viewed the evidence as strongly
supporting the jury's determination that the defendant engaged in
oppressive conduct by taking advantage of the plaintiff's financial
vulnerability. 8,
2. Clear and Convincing Evidence Required in California
In addition to statutorily defining the requisite mental state required
to impose punitive damages, California law requires that the plaintiff
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in
"despicable conduct. ' ' This is a more stringent standard than the
preponderance of the evidence standard used to prove liability in civil
actions. The U.S. Supreme Court approved, but did not require, this
standard in Haslip.'83 It has been argued that this heightened standard
impresses on juries the need for extra consideration in awarding punitive
damages."
California has long provided pattern instructions to advise the jury
as to the basic law regarding punitive damages. Use of the approved
Neal had informed her agent that because she was suffering from cancer, she was eager to receive
payment of the amount owed under her insurance contract. Id. at 984. The court viewed the evidence
as strongly supporting the jury's determination that the defendant engaged in oppressive conduct by
taking advantage of the plaintiff's financial vulnerability. Id. at 986. Neal is similar to State Farm v.
Campbell, in which:
[T]he trial court noted the testimony of several former State Farm employees affirming that
they were trained to target "the weakest of the herd"-"the elderly, the poor, and other
consumers who are least knowledgeable about their rights and thus most vulnerable to
trickery or deceit" . The Campbells themselves could be placed within the "weakest of
the herd" category.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,433-34 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
179. Neal, 582 P.2d at 984.
i8o. Id. at 987 (stating that the defendant's conduct was "designed to utilize the lamentable
circumstances in which Mrs. Neal and her family found themselves, and the exigent financial situation
resulting from it, as a lever to force a settlement more favorable to the company than the facts would
otherwise have warranted").
181. Id. at 986. The jury awarded the plaintiff approximately $1.54 million in punitive damages and
approximately $ io,ooo in compensatory damages. The California Supreme Court reduced the punitive
damages award to $74o,ooo. Id. at 983.
182. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c) (Deering 2005). Each of malice and oppression entails "despicable
conduct." See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c)(1), (2); see also supra note 174.
183. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 n.II (ig9I).
184. See Schwartz & Behrens, supra note I6, at 1381-82. Justice O'Connor asserts that "the clear-
and-convincing-evidence requirement [constrains] the jury's discretion, limiting punitive damages to
the more egregious cases." Haslip, 499 U.S. at 58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see Melsheimer &
Stodghill, supra note I58, at 347 (A higher standard of proof for imposing punitive damages "makes
no sense and has no real parallel anywhere in the law. Moreover, making punitive damages harder to
prove rewards the defendant for gross misconduct and, from an economic efficiency standpoint, does
not provide the proper disincentive for undesirable behavior.").
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instructions is not mandatory, as the parties may submit to the judge for
approval their own written instructions. However, these instructions
certainly set a standard for shaping jury deliberation as to whether clear
and convincing evidence was presented during the trial.'5 For cases in
which punitive damages are sought, the Judicial Council of California has
promulgated different jury instructions for various scenarios, taking into
account such factors as whether the defendant is an individual or an
entity; whether the trial is bifurcated, with damages tried separately; and
whether employer liability stems from the conduct of an employee.'8 The
instructions explain the purpose of punitive damages, the clear and
convincing evidence standard of proof, the statutory specific intent
required to impose punitive damages, and the factors to be considered in
calculating the amount of punitive damages to award. 
8
,
California's jury instructions provide a great deal more guidance
than those criticized by Justice O'Connor in her dissent in Haslip. In that
case, the jury was told: "Imposition of punitive damages is entirely
discretionary with the jury, that means you don't have to award it unless
this jury feels that you should do so."'8 Justice O'Connor faulted such
instructions for providing no guidance as to how the jury should exercise
its discretion.1'
185. See 7 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE: TRIAL § 287B (4 th ed. Supp. 2004); id. §§ 274-275 (4th
ed. 1997). Parties' attorneys may present special instructions to the judge for approval. They "should
be accurate, brief, understandable, impartial, and free from argument," and they "must include a
citation to authority." LEVINE ET AL., supra note 23, at 677 (quoting CAL. R. COURT 22 9 (d)).
186. See Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI) nos. 3940-3949. Before
adoption of the CACI in 2003, California courts had available pattern jury instructions, known as
BAI, promulgated by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 23, at 665,
677.
187. For instance, CACI 3945 includes the following instructions, as well as numerous others:
The purposes of punitive damages are to punish a wrongdoer for the conduct that harmed
the plaintiff and to discourage similar conduct in the future.
You may award punitive damages against [name of defendant] only if [name of plaintiff]
proves that [name of defendant] engaged in that conduct with malice, oppression, or
fraud.... If you decide to award punitive damages, you should consider all of the following
in determining the amount:
(a) How reprehensible was [name of defendant]'s conduct?
(b) Is there a reasonable relationship between the amount of punitive damages and
[name of plain-tiff]'s harm?
(c) In view of [name of defendant]'s financial condition, what amount is necessary to
punish it and discourage future wrongful conduct? You may not increase the punitive
award above an amount that is otherwise appropriate merely because [name of
defendant] has substantial financial resources. [Any award you impose may not exceed
[name of defendant]'s ability to pay.]




B. APPELLATE REVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CALIFORNIA
BEFORE STATE FARM
California's heightened standard of proof is buttressed by a
searching appellate review." ° An award is affirmed only if it is supported
by "substantial evidence.' 9. At least since 1978, when the California
Supreme Court set forth guidelines in Neal v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, California courts have reviewed punitive damages awards
based on the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the amount of
compensatory damages awarded, and the wealth of the defendant.'92
These principles are analogous to the U.S. Supreme Court's Gore
guideposts, except that the California guideposts actually seek to deter
persons from intentionally engaging in reprehensible conduct that harms
others.'93 Rather than having as their primary goal the limitation of an
award, as the Gore guideposts do, California courts aim for a happy
medium: "The channeling of just the correct quantum of bile to reach the
correct level of punitive damages."'" In other words, California courts
recognize that punitive damages can be either too high or too low,
depending on the facts of a particular case; there is no one-size-fits-all
approach.
i. Reprehensibility Analysis in California
California's analysis of reprehensibility is essentially the same as the
Gore guidepost: "the more reprehensible the act, the greater the
appropriate punishment, assuming all other factors are equal."'95 In Gore,
the U.S. Supreme Court identified reprehensibility as the most important
factor in awarding punitive damages., 6  However, if courts are
constitutionally prohibited from awarding punitive damages greater than
a single-digit ratio to compensatory damages, as the Court implies in
State Farm,'97 and as many courts and commentators have inferred,'8
19o. See Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 16, at 1382; see also Haslip, 499 U.S. at 58 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the higher standard "would also permit closer scrutiny of the evidence by trial
judges and reviewing courts"). But see Melsheimer & Stodghill, supra note 158, at 349 (arguing that
heightened standards of proof "devalue the role of the jury as the purveyor of justice in our society").
19I. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.Ed 980, 986 (Cal. 1978).
192. Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Cal. 1991) (citing Neal, 582 P.2d 980).
193. California's first and second guideposts are the same as those set forth in Gore. See supra text
accompanying note 93. The third guidepost in Gore involves a comparison to civil and criminal
sanctions for similar conduct, whereas California's third guidepost is the wealth of the defendant.
Murakami, 813 P.2d at 1350.
194. Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr. 204, 208 (Ct. App. 1984).
195. Neal, 582 P.2d at 990 (citations omitted).
196. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) ("Perhaps the most important
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct."). Perhaps that "perhaps" should have alerted us to the Court's equivocation on
the matter.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
198. See supra notes 17-2 1 and accompanying text.
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then reprehensibility is no longer the most important factor in evaluating
the amount awarded. Rather, the proportionality rule assumes central
importance.' 9  In contrast, the California Supreme Court "has
emphasized that none of the three Neal factors can be dispensed with in
calculating punitive damages awards." '
2. Comparison of Punitive Damages to Compensatory
Damages in California
While California's procedure resembles the Gore guidepost in
comparing punitive damages to the amount of compensatory damages
awarded, California courts have rejected imposing any particular ratio as
a constitutional ceiling.'Ol Thus, while "punitive damages should bear a
reasonable relationship to actual damages suffered... there is no fixed
ratio by which to determine the reasonableness of that relationship .... .A
random sampling of awards compiled by one California appellate court
in 1984 found that such ratios have ranged from one to one to 476.2 to
199. One review of appellate courts' responses to State Farm nationwide affirmed the impression
that the proportionality rule has seized hold of the appellate process and overridden other factors in
evaluating the size of awards. See Birnbaum & Dunham, supra note 21, at I6O-7O.
2oo. Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 993 P.2d 388, 396 (Cal. 2000) (citation omitted).
201. There has been support, however, on the California Supreme Court for judicially imposing a
cap on punitive damages. In Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co., which concerned the standard of review to
be used by an appellate court of a trial court's granting of a new trial, then-Justice Janice Rogers
Brown penned both the majority opinion and a concurring opinion in which she gave a lengthy tirade
on the arbitrariness of punitive damages awards. Id. at 398-404. In that concurring opinion, which was
longer than her opinion for the majority, Justice Brown advocated the imposition of a fixed ratio of
three to one. Id. at 399. She arrived at the factor of three by pointing to statutory limits on punitive
damages, none of which permit punitive damages more than three times compensatory damages. See
supra note 169.
Justice Mosk wrote a separate opinion solely addressing Justice Brown's concurring opinion.
Lane, 993 P.2d at 395-98 (Mosk, J., concurring). He points out that Justice Brown's analysis ignored
the fact that the legislature has imposed caps in only specified circumstances. Id. at 396-97. The
California Code also includes numerous provisions authorizing punitive damages without setting a
cap. See id. at 397. The two opinions juxtapose nicely the arguments made in the debate about punitive
damages. Justice Mosk countered Justice Brown's argument:
Indeed, my research reveals that there are over 150 California statutes that address punitive
or exemplary damages. Taking the concurring opinion's figure that double and treble
damages are used in "more than 30 instances," we must conclude that the Legislature has
used double or treble damages as a limit on punitive damages in a small minority of the
statutes in which it has chosen to address punitive damages.... Rather, all we can safely
generalize, after observing the entire patchwork of punitive damages statutes, is that the
Legislature has enacted a number of statutes containing a variety of responses to punitive
damages, some providing double damages, some treble damages, some providing monetary
caps, some prohibiting punitive damages altogether, and many statutes permitting punitive
damages without limitation.
Id. at 397 (citation omitted).
Justice Brown relied heavily in her opinion on a study of jury deliberation conducted by legal
scholars. See id. at 399-401 (repeatedly citing Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade,
Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071
(1998)). Such work has been the subject of much criticism in large part because it was funded by the
Exxon Corporation. See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 54, at 867; Vidmar, supra note 54, at 136o n.2.
202. Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr. 204,210 (Ct. App. 1984).
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one.20 3 That court endeavored to "discern from the cases a single formula
for calculating punitive damages.... Instead of making a mathematical
breakthrough [they] discovered what everyone probably already knows:
the formula does not exist.""°4 The court embraced the lack of a
discernible ratio as an affirmation of the human element in the law:
Although we may now live in a highly computerized society, it is
important to recognize the justice system need not and should not
mirror a mechanistic view of life. The life of the law should continue to
be experience. The concept of justice connotes a human process,
performed by judges and juries in good faith, exercised with
compassion, still tinged with sufficient subjectivity to conform the rules
of law to the realities of life. 5
Any effort to set a fixed ratio inevitably deprives the law of that human
element. 6 Where punitive damages express the community's values and
its desire to punish and deter reprehensible conduct, that human element
is essential."°
3. The California Defendant's Financial Condition
The third factor in a California court's review of punitive damages is
the financial condition of the defendant. "A reviewing court cannot
make a fully informed determination of whether an award of punitive
203. See id. app. at 211.
204. Id. at 208-09.
205. Id. at 209.
2o6. Legal scholars have criticized the imposition of limits on punitive damages as an infringement
on the role of the jury. See, e.g., Melsheimer & Stodghill, supra note 158, at 348. Melsheimer and
Stodghill quoted then-Justice Rehnquist (writing in the context of res judicata):
"The founders of our Nation considered the right of trial by jury in civil cases an important
bulwark against tyranny.., a safeguard too precious to be left to the whim of... the
judiciary.... Trial by a jury of laymen rather than by the sovereign's judges was important
to the founders because juries represent the layman's common sense .... and thus keep the
administration of law in accord with the wishes and feelings of the community.... Those
who favored juries believed that a jury would reach a result that a judge either could not or
would not reach."
Id. (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343-44 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
Justice Ginsburg has similarly argued that the Court infringed on the province of the jury by
mandating de novo review of punitive damages. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc., 532 U.S. 424,444-47 (20oI).
207. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 6oo (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("At the
time of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was well understood that punitive damages
represent the assessment by the jury, as the voice of the community, of the measure of punishment the
defendant deserved."); see also David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA.
L. REv. 705 (1989) (exploring the moral underpinnings of punitive damages and finding such damages
supported by our cultural conceptions of equality and freedom).
Each person is a morally special, autonomous creature who has the ability and right to
control his own destiny and a duty to do so in a manner respectful of the similar right of
others. Each person, therefore, is entitled to be treated as an end in himself, who should not
be used to his detriment merely as a means to someone else's end.... The law [of punitive
damages] reaffirms the equal worth of all and the duty of each person to respect-to assign
equal worth to-the rights of others.
Id. at 708, 711 (citations omitted).
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damages is excessive unless the record contains evidence of the
defendant's financial condition."2'1 The defendant's "wealth is an
important consideration" because "'the wealthier the wrongdoing
defendant, the larger the award of exemplary damages need be in order
to accomplish the statutory objective"' of punishing and deterring."°
"[O]bviously, the function of deterrence.., will not be served if the
wealth of the defendant allows him to absorb the award with little or no
discomfort .... .Likewise, "the function of punitive damages is not served
by an award which, in light of the defendant's wealth and the gravity of
the particular act, exceeds the level necessary to properly punish and
deter .... ' Recognizing that punitive damages are not intended to destroy
a defendant financially, California courts have reduced punitive damages
awards upon consideration of the defendant's financial condition.2
In California courts, the plaintiff must present evidence of the
defendant's financial condition in order to obtain a punitive damages
award."3 On one hand, such evidence seeks to ensure that a punitive
award is sufficiently large to deter the defendant and others from
engaging in similar conduct in the future."4 "An award which is so small
that it can be simply written off as a part of the cost of doing business
would have no deterrent effect. 2 5 On the other hand, such evidence
ensures that the award is not larger than necessary to deter. '2 6 "Absent
evidence of a defendant's financial condition, a punitive damages award
can financially annihilate him. 2. 7
As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court has cast doubt on this
practice. ' However, it should be noted that California's use of financialcondition as a factor in awarding punitive damages involves significant
208. Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Cal. i991).
209. Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr. 204, 210 (Ct. App. 1984)
(quoting Bertero v. Nat'l Gen. Corp., 529 P.2d 6o8, 624 (Cal. 1974)).
21o. Neal, 582 P.2d at 990.
211. Id.
212. See Murakami, 813 P.2d at 1351-52 (noting several cases in which courts reduced the punitive
damages award because it comprised too great a proportion of the defendant's income or net worth).
213. See, e.g., id. at 1349 ("[An award of punitive damages cannot be sustained on appeal unless
the trial record contains meaningful evidence of the defendant's financial condition."); see also CAL.
CV. CODE § 32 9 5 (d) (Deering 2005) ("Evidence of profit and financial condition shall be presented to
the same trier of fact that found for the plaintiff .. "). "Net worth generally is considered the best
measure of a defendant's 'wealth' for purposes of assessing punitive damages." Devlin, 202 Cal. Rptr.
at 210 (citing Little v. Stuyvesant Life Ins. Co., 136 Cal. Rptr. 653, 663 n.5 (Ct. App. 1977)). However,
since courts also consider other figures that show an ability to pay punitive damages, "wealth" and
"financial condition" are used interchangeably in this Note where they are meant to signify in general
defendant's ability to pay punitive damages.
214. See Murakami, 813 P.2d at 1350.
215. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348,389 (Ct. App. I981).
216. See Murakami, 813 P.2d at 1351.
217. Id. at 1353.
218. See text accompanying notes 22-23, 149-51.
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procedural protections for the defendant. For instance, to protect against
prejudicing the jury against a wealthy defendant, evidence of the
defendant's financial condition is not presented until after the jury has
determined that the defendant's conduct falls within the statute's
definition of malice, oppression or fraud.219 If more than one defendant is
on trial, such evidence is permitted only with regard to the particular
defendant found liable for acts of malice, oppression or fraud."'
California also prevents fishing expeditions into a defendant's financial
condition by requiring court approval for such discovery. Specifically, the
plaintiff must convince the judge that there is a "substantial probability"
that the plaintiff will succeed in proving that the defendant acted with the
requisite malice, oppression or fraud.'
California courts may reverse an award of punitive damages if the
plaintiff fails to present evidence of the defendant's financial condition as
required by statute."2 Although a defendant's net worth is the preferred
measure of a defendant's financial condition for assessing punitive
damages, it has never been viewed as the only type of evidence
permitted.2 For example, one court permitted evidence of the
defendant's monetary gain from its misconduct as sufficient to support an
award. 24 In Cummings Medical Corp. v. Occupational Medical Corp., the
plaintiff did not have the opportunity to obtain and present evidence of
the defendant's net worth because the court entered a default judgment
against the defendant after numerous discovery abuses by the
defendant."' However, because the record contained evidence of the
amount the defendant profited from his allegedly fraudulent actions, the
219. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3 29 5(d). Upon request, a defendant may obtain a bifurcated trial so that
the liability phase is not tainted with evidence relevant only to the question of punitive damages. Id.;
see also Melsheimer & Stodghill, supra note 158, at 349 ("[B]y separating the issue of whether the
defendant is liable from whether the defendant should be punished... the risk that the issue of the
defendant's wealth will taint the liability determination is minimized, if not completely eliminated.");
Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 16, at 1382 ("Bifurcated trials are equitable because they prevent
evidence that may be relevant only to the issue of punitive damages, such as evidence of a defendant's
net worth or profits, from being heard by the jury when it is determining basic liability.").
220. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(d).
221. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(c); see also Jabro v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 845 (Ct.
App. 2002) ("[T]he statute is 'intended to protect defendants from being pressured into settling non-
meritorious cases in order to avoid divulging their financial privacy in civil discovery."' (citation
omitted)). The standard of proof, "substantial probability," is greater than that required to avoid
dismissal on a defendant's motion for summary judgment. See id. at 845.
222. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 3295(d); City of El Monte v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490, 491
(Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting jury's award of punitive damages because of plaintiff's failure to present
evidence of defendant's financial condition).
223, See Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 355 n.7 (Cal. 1991).
224. Cummings Med. Corp. v. Occupational Med. Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 585, 590 (Ct. App. 1992)
("The defendant's profits from misconduct are objectively based and uniquely appropriate as the basis
for punitive damages.").
225. Id. at 587, 591.
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appellate court permitted a total award of compensatory and punitive
damages equal to, but no more than, the defendant's net profit from its
misconduct.2 6
4. California's Punitive Damages Serve a Public Purpose
California recognizes that punitive damages serve a public
purpose.'27 That purpose "is to punish wrongdoing and thereby to protect
226. Id. at 591. This approach implies support for disgorgement or a restitutionary approach in
certain cases.
227. Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1359 (Cal. i99i). Many commentators also refer to the
public function of punitive damages. See, e.g., E. Jeffrey Grube, Note, Punitive Damages: A Misplaced
Remedy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 843 (1993). Grube recommended that, in recognition of the public
function, punitive damages should be paid to the State rather than the plaintiff. Id. Others have argued
that plaintiffs serve as "private attorneys general" and that punitive damages compensate them for
performing a function that the state cannot perform without a cumbersome bureaucracy. See, e.g.,
Galanter & Luban, supra note 162, at 1445; Mallor & Roberts, Principled Approach, supra note 59, at
649-50. Galanter and Luban argue that "the use of punitive damages can be viewed as a partial offset
to weak administrative controls" and that "[n]o federal agency has or could have the resources to carry
out so many investigations, nor would we be likely to welcome a federal agency that is such a nosy
intruder." Galanter & Luban, supra note 162, at 1426, I44I. While Grube recommended that punitive
damages be paid to the state, he recognized the public function plaintiffs serve and, when
compensatory damages are low, recommended that the state pay a portion of the punitive damages to
plaintiffs' attorneys. See Grube, supra, at 856-61.
In contrast, Martin H. Redish and Andrew L. Mathews argued that punitive damages themselves
are unconstitutional because private actors are not legally empowered to vindicate the public interest.
See Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY
L.J. 1 (2004). Rather, they argue, only the state should be permitted to punish private actors:
[AIllowing private plaintiffs to exercise purely public authority in the manner authorized by
the existence of punitive damages perversely upsets the delicate balance, within a liberal
democracy, between the pursuit of private and public interests. As a result, state power that
in a democratic society is presumed to be exercised by those who are required to act only in
the public interest and are subject to some form of ultimate democratic accountability is
transferred to private individuals who lack both the objectivity and accountability normally
associated with the exercise of pristine public power.
Id. at 3. While their argument may appeal to a rigidly formalistic perspective, it ignores both the long
history of imposing punitive damages in civil actions and the pragmatic recognition that leaving the
state to punish especially egregious tortfeasors would either result in lax punishment (and hence
minimal deterrence) or a huge bureaucracy, as Galanter and Luban point out, supra note 162, at 1445.
Redish's and Mathews' likening of such private punishment to "the legal version of vigilantism and
blood feuds" also disregards the state functions performed by the jury, reviewing judge and appellate
review. See Redish & Mathews, supra, at 3. The authors also assumed the existence and necessity of an
extreme private/public dichotomy. See id. at 3-4, 30-34 (arguing that "our constitutional structure
must prevent private power from invading the public sphere"). "Critical legal studies theorists have
attacked the public-private dichotomy on the grounds that the distinction is neither normatively nor
empirically justifiable. Because critical legal studies scholars completely reject the liberal democratic
values associated with individual integrity, however, their attacks must be deemed inconsistent with
the proper normative foundations of American democracy." Id. at 31 n.I32 (citing MORTON HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (977)). For a critique of formalistic
public/private legal distinctions, see Angela P. Harris, Rereading Punitive Damages: Beyond the
Public/Private Distinction, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1079, IO90-99 (1989) (tracing the public/private distinction
to eighteenth-century legal commentators).
California has temporarily imposed a seventy-five percent tax on punitive damages awards, with
the proceeds paid to the Public Benefit Trust Fund. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.5 (Deering 2005). For
criticism of payment of punitive damages to the state, see Victor E. Schwartz et al., I'll Take That:
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[the public] from future misconduct, either by the same defendant or
other potential wrongdoers. The essential question therefore in every
case must be whether the amount of damages awarded substantially
serves the societal interest. ' '22s California courts' focus on the public
purpose of punitive damages distinguishes it from the U.S. Supreme
Court's orientation toward more private concerns, as seen in its focus on
the defendant's harm to the specific plaintiff and its de-emphasis on
deterring harm to others.
2 9
IV. APPELLATE REVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CALIFORNIA
AFTER STATE FARM
California courts have, for the most part, dutifully heeded the
Supreme Court's proportionality rule. They have repeatedly reduced
awards, and they have paid particular attention to the ratio of
compensatory damages to punitive damages. 30 However, in a few cases,
California courts have tweaked the analysis so as to affirm a higher
punitive damages award than might otherwise be permitted under a strict
application of State Farm's proportionality rule.23' Three of these cases-
including two decided by the California Supreme Court on the same
day-are discussed in this Part.
A. CALCULATING POTENTIAL HARM: SIMON V. SAN PAOLO U.S.
HOLDING CO.
Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co. has been reviewed twice by the
U.S. Supreme Court and remanded for reconsideration of the punitive
damages award.32 After each remand, the California Court of Appeal
Legal and Public Policy Problems Raised by Statutes that Require Punitive Damages Awards to be
Shared With the State, 68 Mo. L. REV. 525, 538 (2003) (asserting that "split-recovery statutes may
exacerbate the problem of runaway punitive damages, may introduce prejudice into civil trials, and are
socially, ethically, and constitutionally problematic").
228. Murakami, 813 P.2d at 1350 (citations omitted).
229. But see Part IV.B.2 for the California Supreme Court's critique of the assumption that the
U.S. Supreme Court adopted a narrow, strictly private view of punitive damages in State Farm.
230. See supra note 21.
231. For example, in City of Hope Nat'l Med. Center v. Genentech, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234 (Ct.
App. 2004), rev. granted, 105 P.3d 543 (Cal. 2005), a case involving the withholding of royalties due for
patent licenses, an appellate court affirmed an award of $200 million in punitive damages where the
compensatory damages were approximately $30o million. In doing so, it gave only cursory attention to
the principles laid out in State Farm (perhaps resting comfortably in the two-to-three ratio). See id. at
272-73. The court found the large award justified by the defendant's decades-long practice of
intentionally withholding royalties owed to the plaintiff and concealing the existence of licensing
agreements from the plaintiff in breach of an agreement between the parties. Id. at 273. The court
acknowledged that the harm suffered was merely economic, but seemed to justify the substantial
award by reference to the plaintiff's humanitarian role as a provider of health care: "While Genentech
did not directly jeopardize anyone's life, safety, or health, it damaged an entity that is in the business
of providing medical care to the poor, often at City of Hope's own expense." Id. at 273. The California
Supreme Court has agreed to hear this case. 1o5 P.3d 543 (Cal. 2005).
232. See San Paolo U.S. Holding Co. v. Simon, 532 U.S. 1050 (2oo) (remanding for consideration
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affirmed the jury's award of $1.7 million in punitive damages, where
compensatory damages were $5,000. In its most recent remand, the
appellate court applied the Gore guideposts and State Farm's
proportionality rule, and arrived at the same result. The California
Supreme Court heard this case and predictably reduced the punitive
damages award to $50,000.2
Simon involved promissory fraud in the context of a real estate
transaction. '34 The defendant, San Paolo, was the subsidiary of a bank,
with a net worth in the range of $45 to $55 million. 35 The plaintiff,
Simon, was the owner of a small paper and printing business that
competed with larger businesses like Office Depot and Staples.36 His
assets were said to be approximately $I million. 37 Simon sought to
purchase a building owned by San Paolo that could house his business.
He negotiated the purchase with Duane King, a vice president of San
Paolo."' The facts are somewhat complicated, but essentially King did
not deal honestly with Simon.39 The jury determined that San Paolo
(through King) failed to negotiate exclusively with Simon in good faith as
promised in a letter of intent: while negotiating with Simon, King also
negotiated with another buyer, to whom the building was eventually sold.
When the negotiations fell apart, Simon sued for specific performance of
in light of Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2OO)); San Paolo U.S.
Holding Co. v. Simon, 538 U.S. 974 (2003).
233. Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 66 (Cal. 2005).
234. Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 367, 376,378 (Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 113
P.3d 63 (Cal. 2005). The court explained that "promissory fraud requires proof of an unperformed
promise, made about a material fact, without any intention of performing it, and with the intent to
deceive the plaintiff or to induce entry into a transaction; and upon which the plaintiff justifiably and
injuriously relies." Id. at 378.
235. Id. at 394-95.
236. Id. at 390 n.15.
237. Id. at 384 n.9.
238. Id. at 379.
239. Id. at 376. Simon, who had a law degree and was not represented by counsel until the deal fell
apart, negotiated and approved a letter of intent that included the word "binding" in it. Id. at 379-81.
When San Paolo's representative faxed him a revised letter of intent for Simon's signature, the word
"binding" had been removed. Id. at 380. However, Simon assumed it was still binding; he had
specifically negotiated for a binding agreement to negotiate exclusively because King had previously
repeatedly changed the terms of the deal. Id. at 379-80 & n.7. Simon signed the letter of intent
(without the word "binding" in it) and sent it to San Paolo. That same day (June 12, 1996) he was told
that King had signed it also and that "[w]e have a deal." Id. That evening, however, Simon received a
faxed copy of the fully signed letter of intent; the fax cover included the note, "Signed Letter of Intent
(nonbinding)." Id. The next day, King demanded new terms, but Simon refused, demanding instead
that King honor the letter of intent, which King refused to do. Id. at 38o-81. Two days after signing the
letter of intent, on June 14, Simon received a fax from King terminating negotiations. Id. at 381.
In the meantime, King had been negotiating with a second buyer for the same building and, on
June 14, opened escrow for that transaction. Id. Inexplicably, on June 17, King contacted Simon and
agreed to the letter of intent, but at a price of $1,5oo,ooo, which was $400,000 more than the price set
forth in the letter of intent. Id. at 381, 379. Negotiations ended, and Simon filed suit on June 21,
seeking specific performance for the sale of the property. Id. at 375-76.
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the sale of the building.4'
Simon's request for specific performance was dismissed but the
cause of action for promissory fraud went to trial. A jury found for
Simon, awarding him $5,000 in compensatory damages and $2.5 million
in punitive damages. 4' When Simon refused a reduction in punitive
damages to $250,000, the court granted a new trial on the issue of
punitive damages. The second jury awarded $1.7 million.242 It was this
verdict that the U.S. Supreme Court twice remanded for reconsideration.
i. The Appellate Court's Erroneous Analysis of Harm in Simon
After the second remand, the California Appellate Court applied
the Gore guideposts. Under its reprehensibility analysis, the court
acknowledged that the case lacked many of the aggravating factors set
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gore and reiterated in State Farm.243
Nevertheless, the court found the aggravating factors of "intentional
trickery or deceit" and a "pattern of deceit," rejecting the defendant's
"characterization of its misconduct as a single incident of only a false
promise" or "just a business deal gone awry." 2" San Paolo's pattern of
deceit consisted of the perfidious conduct of King while negotiating with
both Simon and a second buyer, as well as King's "lying to the trial
court" both in testimony and in filing "false declarations. '45
Under the second guidepost, "disparity between the harm (or
potential harm) suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award," the court found that the compensatory damages did not reflect
the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff4 6 Rather, the substantive law
provided that "a defrauded purchaser of real property, who does not
succeed in acquiring the property, may recover only his or her out-of-
pocket losses, not benefit-of-the-bargain damages." '47 In other words, the
Simon court acknowledged that compensatory damages do not
necessarily reflect the harm suffered by the plaintiff. ,8 The court found
that Simon's actual harm included the loss of the bargain, which the
court calculated as the difference between the sales price of $i.i million
set forth in the letter of intent and the building's appraised value of $i. 5
million. 49 Thus, with actual harm of $400,000, the ratio of punitive
240. Id. at 381, 375-76.
241. Id. at 376.
242. Id.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 1oo-o8, 125.
244. Simon, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 385.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 386-87, 390.
247. Id. at 388 (citing Kenly v. Ukegawa, i9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 771 (Ct, App. t993); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 3343).
248. Other California courts have made the same observation. See supra text accompanying note
355.
249. See Simon, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 390. Both parties agreed the appraised value was $I.5 million. Id.
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damages to compensatory damages was "just over 4 to i. ' '25 The court
justified its analysis by noting that "the Supreme Court did not prohibit
consideration of harm to the plaintiff that is not reflected in the
compensatory-damage award. Indeed, the Court has approved a similar
factor, [permitting consideration of] the harm that is likely to result from
the defendant's conduct. ' .5'
Under the third guidepost, the court noted statutes that permit
treble damages "for economic injury to senior citizens or disabled
persons through unfair or deceptive practices" and "for eviction based on
a fraudulent intent to occupy. 252 Because King deceived Simon into
believing that San Paolo was negotiating exclusively with Simon, the
court found these statutes to be instructive. 53 The court proceeded to
analyze the ratio in light of California's punitive damages precedent,
including consideration of the defendant's wealth. The court concluded
that the award "was not excessive on its face" because it represented less
than five percent of the defendant's net worth.5 4
There are two significant problems with the appellate court's
analysis in Simon. One, its reprehensibility analysis overstates the case.
While King certainly engaged in conduct that would frustrate any honest
businessperson, it is difficult to believe that his conduct merited $I.7
million in punitive damages when Simon's out-of-pocket costs were only
$5,000. Simon was not physically injured or defrauded of property.
Instead, he wasted time negotiating with a feckless person. The level of
deception involved was also overstated. The court's presentation of the
evidence showed that Simon knew that King was unreliable.55
The court bolstered its analysis with a reference to unquantifiable harm: "Simon also lost a unique
opportunity. Small office buildings rarely come on the market in the location of the subject five-story
office building, and Simon found it to be perfect for his paper and printing business...." Id. at 390
n.I 5 .
250. Id. at 390.
25L. Id.
252. Id. at 393 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3345, 1947.10).
253. Id. ("Thus, a multiplier of at least three is appropriate in a case involving deceptive
practices.").
254. Id. at 395. Under California precedent, "punitive damages awards are generally limited to io
percent or less of the defendant's net worth." Id. (citing Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d
510 (Ct. App. 1998)).
255. See id. at 379-80 & n.7. For instance, two months before entering into the letter of intent,
King repeatedly changed the terms of the deal, first accepting $I.i million then $1.29 million, then
$1.35 million. Id. at 379 n.7. Simon sought an exclusive dealing clause in the letter of intent because he
knew that Simon was unreliable. Id. at 379. Presumably these offers and acceptances were not
sufficient to establish a contract because the jury held that no contract for the sale of the building was
formed. Id. at 376. The court's opinion does not state whether this was because these offers were
merely oral or because they were conditional offers. The court's summary of the issue of contract
formation in the case is confusing. As the court notes, the jury was not instructed to determine
whether a contract was formed but whether a binding and enforceable contract existed. "The jury's
finding of fraud implies that it found that the parties did enter into a contract, but the contract was
March 2006]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Furthermore, Simon was not an uneducated, financially vulnerable
target. He was a businessperson with a law degree.? While he was not a
sophisticated real estate buyer, '57 certainly he was able to see that the
deal was full of holes, especially since King refused to negotiate honestly.
While none of these factors excuses King's unprincipled conduct, neither
do they seem as reprehensible as an insurance company taking advantage
of financially vulnerable persons to whom they are contractually
obligated, an automobile manufacturer knowingly manufacturing an
unsafe automobile,259 or a pharmaceutical company marketing a drug
while concealing knowledge of its harmful effects? 6°
The appellate court's analysis of Simon's harm raises another
problem. While it is logical and seems legally permissible to take into
consideration harm not reflected in the amount of compensatory
damages, the court overstated the harm suffered by the plaintiff. The
court awarded Simon punitive damages based on his loss of bargain, but
it disregarded the fact that there was no contract for the sale of the
building. 6  The promise that San Paolo failed to keep-the promise at
the heart of the promissory fraud cause of action-consisted of the
promise to negotiate exclusively and in good faith, as set forth in the
letter of intent. Without question, King failed to uphold his end of that
bargain, as the jury determined. However, it seems incongruous to award
damages based on contract terms that were never agreed upon.
63
unenforceable, We cannot conclude that the jury found that no contract was formed in the first
instance." Id. at 377-78. The court is unclear as to the nature of the contract in its discussion of the
jury verdict. Presumably, because the signed document was a letter of intent, then the letter of intent is
the contract at issue, and thus, the promise pertained to negotiating in good faith and not to the
specific terms for selling the building.
256. See id. at 384 n.9.
257. Id.
258. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2oo3); Neal v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 582 P.2d 980 (Cal. 1978).
259. See Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793 (Ct. App. 2003) (awarding punitive damages
of approximately $24 million for marketing of unsafe 1978 Bronco model); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. i98i) (awarding punitive damages of $3.5 million for unsafe design
of the Ford Pinto).
260. See, e.g., supra note 59.
26i. Simon, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3 d at 376 (stating that "the jury found that there was no enforceable
contract between the parties").
262. The letter of intent included the following: "Seller and buyer agree to exclusively negotiate
upon execution of this letter." Id. at 380. The letter of intent was also conditioned on the approval of
King's superiors. Id. at 379.
263. The case also raises the issue of whether a party should be punished for what is essentially an
efficient breach. Certainly the jury verdict represents a rejection of that principle. Professor Dodge has
argued that punitive damages should be permitted even for "efficient" breaches of contract because
compensatory damages do not actually put the non-breaching party in its rightful position once
litigation costs are factored into the equation. See Dodge, supra note i66, at 663-78. Since the
transactional costs of negotiation are generally lower than the costs of litigation, Professor Dodge
argued, it is more efficient to negotiate a release than to litigate a breach; punitive damages provide
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Awarding $1.7 million as punishment for causing a few months of
genuine aggravation invites headlines mocking runaway jury verdicts. It
does not reflect a principled application of the legal principles set forth in
either State Farm or earlier punitive damages jurisprudence.
2. California Supreme Court Reduces Simon's Punitive Damages
Award While Affirming the Relevance of Potential Harm
In an opinion by Justice Werdegar, the California Supreme Court
analyzed the punitive damages award in Simon in terms of whether
$400,000 accurately represented the actual or potential harm caused by
San Paolo's conduct. By framing the issue in this way, the court affirmed
the propriety of considering the "use of measures of harm beyond the
compensatory damages. ' 64 The court thus rejected a slavish reliance on
compensatory damages as the sole measure of harm and broadened the
proportionality rule from the simple compensatory-to-punitive damages
ratio to a "punitive damages-to-harm ratio.' 26S The court found ample
support for measuring punitive damages against potential harm in U.S.
Supreme Court precedent."6
The court discussed at length situations where factors other than the
amount of compensatory damages-such as uncompensated harm and
potential harm-may be appropriate in calculating punitive damages.
For example, when compensatory damages are limited by statute, they,6,
do not adequately measure the harm caused. In such a case, the
measure of harm may include factors other than compensatory damages.
However, the court rejected Simon's argument that he suffered
uncompensated harm. 68
The court also acknowledged that potential harm was an appropriate
measure but found that Simon failed to show potential harm of a type
that is reasonably foreseeable 69 It found the valuation of Simon's harm
at $400,000 to be in error because the jury determined that the parties
did not have a contract for the purchase of the building. Distinguishing
between "fraudulent promises to negotiate exclusively" and breach of a
sales contract, the court noted that "San Paolo Holding's promissory
fraud did not deprive [Simon] of property he would otherwise have
added incentive to a party to negotiate a release from contractual performance. Id. at 666-67.
264. Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63,71 (Cal. 2005). The opinion was unanimous
as Chief Justice George and Justices Kennard, Baxter, Chin, Brown and Moreno joined Justice
Werdegar.
265. Id. at 74.
266. Id. at 71 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court "referred to the relationship between punitive
damages and both 'the amount of harm' and 'the general damages recovered,' impliedly recognizing
that these two are not always identical").
267. Id. at 73. The court noted that Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 582 P.2d 908 (Cal. 1978)
was such a case.
268. Simon, t13 P.3d at 72.
269. Id. at 74-75.
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obtained; it merely led him, as the jury indeed found, to spend $5,000 to
retain an attorney in anticipation of opening escrow." 70 Potential harm is
foreseeable when it was a "reasonably likely risk" or "goal of the
tortfeasor's conduct."27' Only when harm is reasonably foreseeable does
a defendant have adequate notice that punitive damages may result from
the defendant's conduct. Simon's harm did not include benefit-of-the-
bargain damages because Simon never had a contract to purchase the
property.272 Thus, the court concluded, $5,000 "must be considered the
true measure of the harm (or potential harm) San Paolo Holding's
tortious act caused to Simon."273
After establishing the proper measure of harm, the court applied the
Gore guideposts. It analyzed the degree of reprehensibility according to
the factors mentioned in Gore and State Farm,74 and determined that San
Paolo's conduct was "of relatively low culpability" because it exhibited
only one of the aggravating factors mentioned by the Court. 75 With
respect to the second Gore guidepost-which it characterized as the ratio
of punitive damages to actual or potential harm rather than
compensatory damages-the court deemed the proportionality rule a
mere "presumption. '' 7' Specifically, ratios that are "significantly greater
than nine or io to one are suspect and, absent special justification (by, for
example, extreme reprehensibility or unusually small, hard-to-detect or
hard-to-measure compensatory damages), cannot survive appellate
scrutiny under the due process clause." '277 The court dispensed with the
kind of quibbling other courts have engaged in as to whether the U.S.
Supreme Court's "single-digit" ratio sets a nine-to-one or a ten-to-one
ratio as the "constitutional trigger point": "The question is of little or no
importance, however, as the presumption of constitutionality applies
270. Id. at 72.
271. Id. at 74.
272. Simon also attempted to characterize as potential harm the cost he would have incurred had
he ended his current lease in anticipation of purchasing the building. The court rejected that as well
due to the lack of an enforceable purchase contract. Only after entering into a binding purchase
contract would it be foreseeable to San Paolo that Simon would terminate his current lease. Id. at 74-
75.
273. Id. at 75.
274. See supra text accompanying notes ioo-o8.
275. Simon, 113 P.3d at 76. That factor was intent, which already serves as a prerequisite to
obtaining punitive damages under California law:
True, a comparison to accidentally caused harm is of little value in assessing a California
punitive damages award, as accidentally harmful conduct cannot provide the basis for
punitive damages under our law. At a minimum, California law requires conduct done with
"willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others" or despicable conduct
done "in conscious disregard" of a person's rights.
Id. (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(c)(1)-(2)).
276. Id. at 77.
277. Id. (emphasis added).
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only to awards exceeding the single-digit level 'to a significant degree..''78
The court reiterated this point several times,279 recognizing that State
Farm left the door open for a significant disparity between compensatory
and punitive damages in certain cases.
The court found the third Gore guidepost-comparison to
comparable civil penalties-of little usefulness.2 But, because Simon's
award of $1.7 million "was 340 times his $5,ooo award of compensatory
damages," and could not be justified on the basis of being especially
reprehensible, it required reduction.""
After analyzing the Gore guideposts, the court addressed the
defendant's financial condition, thereby affirming its continued relevance
under California punitive damages jurisprudence."' The court repeated
the policies underlying the role of the defendant's financial condition as
developed by California case law.3 In particular, the court asserted:
[T]he defendant's financial condition is an essential factor in fixing an
amount that is sufficient to serve these goals [of punishment and
deterrence] without exceeding the necessary level of punishment.
"[O]bviously, the function of deterrence ... will not be served if the
wealth of the defendant allows him to absorb the award with little or
no discomfort."... "[P]unitive damage awards should not be a routine
cost of doing business that an industry can simply pass on to its
customers through price increases, while continuing the conduct the
law proscribes."... On the other hand, "the purpose of punitive




After setting forth the rationale for including wealth as a factor, the court
reiterated its commitment to deterrence as a goal for punitive damages.
The state's legitimate interest in deterrence justifies the court's
consideration of a defendant's financial condition. "Because a court
reviewing the jury's award for due process compliance may consider
what level of punishment is necessary to vindicate the state's legitimate
interests in deterring conduct harmful to state residents, the defendant's
financial condition remains a legitimate consideration in setting punitive
damages. ' ', 85 The court found support for its approach in the U.S.
Supreme Court's "decisions as a whole. ''2 86 Wealth "cannot alone justify a
high award" but it may nonetheless inform a reviewing court's analysis."7
278. Id. at 77 n-7 (quoting State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)) (emphasis added).
279. See id. at 76-77 (repeating four times "significant degree" or "significantly greater" in
reference to the proportionality rule).
280. Id. at 78.
281. Id.
282. See id. at 78-81.
283. Id. at 78-79; see also supra Part III.D.
284. Simon, I 13 P.3d at 78-79 (citations omitted).
285. Id. at 79.
286. Id.
287. Id. (emphasis added).
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For instance, where a defendant's conduct is particularly reprehensible
but has resulted in low compensatory damages, the defendant's financial
condition may "justi Y an extraordinary ratio between compensatory and
punitive damages."' With respect to Simon, the court found that the
relatively low degree of reprehensibility did not merit significant
augmentation of punitive damages due to the defendant's wealth.
89
The California Supreme Court reduced the punitive damages award
in Simon to ten times the compensatory damages. In doing so, it
rationalized its decision on several grounds. One, it noted that the
compensatory damages were low and accurately reflected the harm
caused; thus, it was not a case where the harm was unquantifiable or
greater than the compensatory damages. 9 Finally, it determined that
$50,000 causes sufficient sting for "even a prosperous company,"
especially since its tortious conduct was itself not profitable for the
defendant.9 '
B. REAFFIRMING THE PUBLIC PURPOSE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
REPEATED SIMILAR CONDUCT AS EVIDENCE OF GREATER
REPREHENSIBILITY IN JOHNSON V. FORD
i. Recidivism in the Civil Context
The California Supreme Court addressed the difficult question of
the role of repeat conduct in assessing punitive damages when it reversed
the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Johnson v. Ford, in an opinion
written by Justice Werdegar and released the same day as his opinion for
the court in Simon.92 In Johnson, the purchaser of a used Ford
automobile prevailed on a fraud cause of action as a result of the
concealment of the automobile's history of repairs in violation of
California's "Lemon Law." 93 The plaintiff showed that Ford engaged in
a widespread practice of deliberately misinterpreting the Lemon Law so
as to avoid complying with that law's repurchase and disclosure
requirements. 94 The jury awarded $io million in punitive damages and
$17,812 in compensatory damages."9 Johnson had argued that Ford saved
between $6 million and $io million per year in California by not
288. Id. at 8o.
289. Id.
29o. Id. at 8i.
291. Id. at 82.
292. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., I13 P-3d 82 (Cal. 2005).
293. See id. at 85-88; see also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790-1795.7 (Deering 2005) (Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act).
294. See Johnson, 113 P.3d at 85-88 (noting the appellate court's determination that the
"'defendant's entire customer response program was structured precisely to short-circuit lemon law
claims whenever defendant plausibly could"').
295. Id. at 85.
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complying with the Lemon Law.29 6 However, the appellate court reduced
the punitive damages award to $53,435 (approximately three times the
compensatory damages) based on its understanding that State Farm
prohibited an award of punitive damages that punished conduct engaged
in against persons other than the present plaintiff. 9'
The California Supreme Court held that the lower court erred when
it determined that State Farm required courts to punish only the
defendant's conduct toward the plaintiff in question without regard to
any broader course of tortious conduct?9 By carefully interpreting the
U.S. Supreme Court's various pronouncements on the matter, the court
resolved that while evidence of repeat conduct-whether in-state or out-
of-state-cannot be used as "'multiplier in computing"' punitive
damages, "'such evidence may be relevant to the determination of the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct."' 9 The court
noted that in Gore, the U.S. Supreme Court "acknowledged that
recidivism increases the wrongfulness of a defendant's conduct and may
justify greater punishment."'" The court quoted the many, varied
pronouncements in State Farm on the issue of repeated conduct and
determined that such conduct remains relevant as evidence of
reprehensibility so long as the other acts are similar to the conduct at
issue in the case at hand.3"' Thus where a defendant engages in a
296. Id. at 87.
297. Id. at 85; see also Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., Nos. Fo4o188, Fo4o529, 2003 WL 22794432, at
*6 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003).
298. Johnson, ii3 P.3d at 97.
[A] defendant's recidivism is relevant to the reprehensibility of its conduct. To the extent
the evidence shows the defendant had a practice of engaging in, and profiting from,
wrongful conduct similar to that which injured the plaintiff, such evidence may be
considered on the question of how large a punitive damages award due process permits.
Id.
299. Id. at 89 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28 (1993); BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,574 n.21 (I996)).
300. Id. at go. The California Supreme Court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court in Gore: .'Our
holdings that a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first offender recognize that repeated
misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance."' Id. (quoting Gore, 517
U.S. at 576-77).
301. Id. at 9o-9 I .
While both BMW and State Farm were cases in which the evidence state courts had
considered of conduct toward others was impermissibly broad, the United States Supreme
Court's analysis in both cases makes clear that due process does not prohibit state courts, in
awarding or reviewing punitive damages, from considering the defendant's illegal or
wrongful conduct toward others that was similar to the tortious conduct that injured the
plaintiff of plaintiffs. We therefore join the numerous courts holding that a civil defendant's
recidivism remains pertinent to an assessment of culpability.
Id. (citing Diamond Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 736 (Ct. App. 2003);
Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2004); Cont'l Trend Res. v. OXY USA, Inc.,
ioi F.3d 634 (ioth Cir. 1996); Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of
Life Activists, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (D. Or. 2004); Bocci v. Key Pharms., Inc., 76 P.3d 669 (Or. Ct.
App. 2003); Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Tower Ins. Co., 661 N.W.2d 789 (Wis. 2003)).
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widespread practice of committing similar acts of tortious conduct, as in
Johnson, evidence of that practice increases the reprehensibility indicium
and, hence, the amount of punitive damages.
2. California Supreme Court Reaffirms the Public Purpose
of Punitive Damages
The California Supreme Court expended considerable ink in
critiquing the Fifth District Court of Appeal's pronouncements in Romo
v. Ford Motor Co., which that appellate court decided on the same day it
decided Johnson, and on which it relied in Johnson."2 Romo made broad
assertions about the purpose of punitive damages that the California
Supreme Court held to be erroneous. The plaintiffs in Romo were three
children whose parents and a sibling were killed in an accident involving
a Ford Bronco.3"3 The plaintiffs themselves were also injured in the crash,
which resulted when Juan Romo swerved to avoid another car that cut in
front of them.3 4 The Bronco rolled over and the entire roof collapsed,
despite the "false appearance of the presence of an integral roll-bar."3 "3
The case went to a jury, which found that Ford "willfully and
consciously" ignored the fact that the design of the 1978 model was
defective; Ford failed to test the strength of the roof even though its
design was contrary to Ford's own safety standards.' °6 The jury awarded
the Romo children collectively $5 million in compensatory damages and
$290 million in punitive damages.3" 7 After a series of appeals affirming
the judgment, the case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
vacated the judgment and remanded it for reconsideration in light of
State Farm.°8
Finding a fundamental conflict between State Farm and California's
"broad view" of punitive damages, the appellate court in Romo
determined that California must "reexamine the purpose and nature of
punitive damages."" The court explained that California's "broad view"
of punitive damages recognizes that a faulty product harms not just the
plaintiff but the public at large.3 ° For instance, California would punish
Ford for "put[ting] at risk all who drove or rode in this model Bronco. 3..
Thus, under this broad view, punitive damages vindicate the public
302. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793 (Ct. App. 2003); Johnson v. Ford Motor Co.,
Nos. Fo4o188, Fo4o52 9 , 2003 WL 22794432 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (unpublished decision); Johnson, 113
P.3d at 91-93.
303. Romo, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 797-98.
304. Id. at 798.
305. Id. at 798,806.
306. Id. at 806.
307. Id. at 798.
308. See id.
309. Id. at 798.
310. Id. at 802.
31. Id. at 8o6.
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interest."2
However, according to the appellate court, State Farm "impliedly
disapproved this broad view."3 '3 Instead, it affirmed the "narrow view" of
punitive damages that "focuses primarily on what defendant did to the
present plaintiff."3"4 Thus under State Farm's narrow view, punitive
damages do not serve a true deterrence purpose."5 Rather than seeking
to punish Ford for risking the lives of every passenger of the 1978 model,
the goal under State Farm is merely to inflict punishment for the harm to
the present plaintiff. The goal of deterring Ford's "reckless disregard of
consumers' safety and lives" implicitly falls out of the equation.36
Because the Romo jury's award of $290 million "was justified only as a
means to actually punish and deter an entire course of conduct that
harmed not only plaintiffs but, potentially, untold others," the appellate
court in Romo deemed it necessary to reduce that award to
approximately $24 million to comply with State Farm's narrow view of
punitive damages.3"7
312. See id. at 8oi.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 802-03 ("The issue ... is not whether a particular punitive damages award is sufficient
actually and in fact to dissuade the course of conduct but, instead, whether such award punishes and
deters to an extent found sufficient historically." (emphasis added)).
316. Id. at 806. The court asserted that the U.S. Supreme Court "limited the goal that the states are
permitted to reach through punitive damages: 'Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation
of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant
under the guise of the reprehensibility analysis." Id. at 802. Even if the appellate court's interpretation
of State Farm is erroneous as to the private nature of punitive damages, its repeated references to
California's "actual" deterrence nevertheless underscores the emptiness of the Supreme Court's
narrow view of deterrence. See id. at 8oi-o3.
317. See id. at 802. Seeming constrained by State Farm's assertion that a lower ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages is proper when compensatory damages are particularly high, as in
this case, the Romo court expended much effort justifying a ratio of approximately five to one. See id.
at 8o7-12. Notably, the court explained how, due to erroneous or confused jury instructions,
substantive law limiting compensatory damages, and confusing categorization of damages in the
verdict form, the plaintiffs' recovery in compensatory damages did not reflect their actual harm. Id.
Because the estates of the deceased Romo family members could not recover punitive damages, the
court held that in this case higher punitive damages were warranted:
In this context of malicious conduct, as opposed to ordinary negligence actions, public
policy and legitimate interests of the state in the protection of its people require a
mechanism to punish and deter conduct that kills people. It would be unacceptable public
policy to establish a system in which it is less expensive for a defendant's malicious conduct
to kill rather than injure a victim. Thus, the state has an extremely strong interest in being
able to impose sufficiently high punitive damages in malicious-conduct wrongful death
actions to deter a "cheaper to kill them" mindset, while still maintaining limits on wrongful
death compensation in cases of ordinary negligence.
Id. at 8io-ii (citations omitted). In affirming a ratio of five to one, where punitive damages were
already significant, the court sought to ensure that it was not cheaper for the defendant to have caused
death than injury. Id.
Since the California Supreme Court did not take issue with the appellate court's calculation of
harm in Romo, it seems reasonable to believe the higher court viewed the appellate court's higher
ratio as being in keeping with Simon's pronouncements regarding the relevance of uncompensated
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In Johnson, the California Supreme Court explicitly rejected the
reasoning of the Romo appellate court and, in doing so, affirmed the
public purpose of punitive damages. In its view, Gore "expressly affirms
a state's constitutional freedom to use punitive damages as a tool to
protect the consuming public, not merely to punish a private wrong."' 8
In addition, the court asserted, State Farm "did not bar deterrence of
future public injuries as a goal of punitive damages."3 '9 Thus in the
California Supreme Court's view, the public purpose is served by
imposing punitive damages with sufficient sting to serve as a deterrent to
repeat conduct, and State Farm did not eliminate that public purpose.
3. California Supreme Court Rejects a Disgorgement Theory but
Profitability Remains Relevant
With questionable reasoning, the California Supreme Court in
Johnson rejected an aggregate disgorgement theory of punitive
damages.32 Nonetheless, the court deemed the profitability of the
defendant's tortious conduct relevant to the quantification of punitive
damages by virtue of its relevance in the reprehensibility analysis. 2 ' But
the court's pronouncements on reprehensibility in Johnson are
troublesome to the extent that they equate profitability with
reprehensibility. Why should conduct be deemed more reprehensible
simply by virtue of being more profitable? The court does not address
that question. Rather, it deems profitability "relevant to reprehensibility
and hence to the size of award warranted.., to meet the state's interest
in deterrence.
'322
If punitive damages are to be tied to the profitability of the
defendant's conduct, it seems that the court should embrace a
disgorgement theory.323 Although the court acknowledged the merit of
removing profits earned by the defendant from its actions toward the
plaintiff, it exhibited great concern for an aggregate disgorgement
approach because it raises the problem of multiple punitive damages
harm. See supra Part IV.A.
318. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., II3 P.3 d 82, 92 (Cal. 2005) (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 559 (1996)); see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Ned Miltenberg, The Need to Clarify the
Meaning of U.S. Supreme Court Remands: The Lessons of Punitive Damages' Cases, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
513, 521-22 (2004) (arguing that the appellate court in Romo "misread State Farm as adopting changes
in the law of punitive damages that the Supreme Court had actually rejected").
319. Johnson, 113 P.3d at 92.
320. Id. at 93 ("To recognize that recidivism remains relevant is not to approve plaintiffs'
aggregate disgorgement theory of punitive damages."). However, the court did not categorically reject
an aggregate disgorgement approach: "We need not decide whether a plaintiff could ever, consistent
with due process, justify the size of an award on a total profits basis." Id. at 96.
321. Id. at 93 ("The scale and profitability of a course of wrongful conduct ... remain relevant to
reprehensibility and hence to the size of award warranted, under the guideposts, to meet the state's
interest in deterrence.").
322. Id.
323. See infra Part V.A.
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verdicts repeatedly disgorging the same profits.3 24 For instance, if the
Johnsons were granted the entire profit from Ford's abusive avoidance of
California's Lemon Law, then the next plaintiff to sue Ford for the same
conduct during the same time period would either receive no punitive
damages on the grounds that Ford had already been relieved of its profits
from that conduct, or Ford would be disgorged of its profits a second
time. However, if no other plaintiffs bring suit, a likely possibility, then
the lack of aggregate disgorgement may result in the defendant profiting
from its conduct.325
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE IMPOSITION OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CALIFORNIA
Punitive damages jurisprudence should not be viewed as a one-size-
fits-all endeavor. No single mathematical formula or programmatic
analysis can suffice for the imposition of punitive damages in cases
involving different kinds of conduct, different kinds of parties, and
different kinds of injury. The different statutory limits on punitive
damages for different causes of action in California reflect this fact. Thus,
punitive damages should not simply be tied to compensatory damages
but should vary depending on the type of conduct and the parties
involved, as well as the many factors discussed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in its cases preceding State Farm. For example, the methodology
employed to calculate punitive damages should vary depending on
whether the defendant's conduct: (i) resulted in purely economic harm to
one or many persons; (ii) put at risk the plaintiff's health and safety; (iii)
put at risk the health and safety of numerous individuals; (iv) resulted in
physical injury or death; or (v) involved abuse of power against someone
in a relatively weaker position. In short, imposition of punitive damages
awards requires a much more nuanced approach than that provided in
State Farm. What follows are merely examples of how such analyses may
be conducted under different fact scenarios.
A. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CASES OF PURELY ECONoMIc HARM
In cases of purely economic harm, punitive damages should
324. See Johnson, 133 P.3 d at 93-94; see also Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment
Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 592-
602 (2003) (arguing the unfairness of awarding "total harm" punitive damages to a single plaintiff);
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 48-53 (Tex. 1998) (acknowledging that
"repeatedly imposing punitive damages on the same defendant for the same course of wrongful
conduct may implicate substantive due process constraints," but holding that the defendant's
"financial position is not so precarious that further punitive damages awards against it should be
disallowed").
325. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Disaggregating More-Than-Whole Damages in Personal Injury
Law: Deterrence and Punishment, 71 TENN. L. REV. 117, I19-20, 130-36 (2004) (suggesting reasons
why the victims of a defendant's tortious conduct might not sue the defendant).
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recognize inequalities of bargaining power, as Justice Kennedy argued in
his concurring opinion in TXO.3  For instance, fraud committed by a
corporate entity in the context of dealings with another corporate entity
should be treated differently than fraud committed by a corporate entity
against an individual who lacks legal sophistication or economic power.
Thus, an insurance company defrauding the sick, elderly and
impoverished, as was the case in Neal, should be punished more harshly
than a seller of real estate who refuses to negotiate in good faith, as was
the case in Simon, or a car manufacturer that fraudulently fails to
disclose that a new car received paint damage in transit and was thus
repainted, as was the case in Gore. Physical injury should be punished
more harshly than purely economic harm. Thus, a car manufacturer that
fails to disclose a history of repairs, as in Johnson, should incur greater
punishment because of the threat to safety posed by poorly operating
automobiles. And a pharmaceutical company that knowingly markets
drugs with potentially life-threatening side effects should be punished
more harshly than a pharmaceutical company that engages in price-
fixing. However, if that price-fixing resulted in lower-income individuals
being unable to afford a life-sustaining medication, then that fact should
be permitted to augment an award in a price-fixing case.
i. Disgorgement
In certain types of cases, disgorgement represents a reasonable and
ethical means of calculating punitive damages. Professor Dagan
explained that the selection of a remedial measure reflects a value
choice, and that a disgorgement remedy better "vindicate[es] the
cherished libertarian value of control over one's entitlements." '327 Dagan's
analysis centers on the notion of a "plaintiff's entitlement," which I
translate into the plaintiff's right to choose her destiny and be free of
harm. A tort reflects a nonconsensual deprivation of the plaintiff's
entitlement and thus an infringement of her right to be unharmed. By
depriving the defendant of all benefit from its wrongful conduct,
disgorgement recognizes the plaintiff's inherent right to control her
destiny. In comparison, a remedy measured by the harm suffered by the
plaintiff may enable the wrongdoer to benefit from the harm caused
without the victim's consent and thus does not adequately reflect the
principles of freedom and equality."' Dagan essentially advocates
326. See supra text accompanying note 82.
327. HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHics OF RESTITUTION 214 (2004).
328. "[T]he harm measure can be understood as a form of limited institutionalized altruism: a legal
device that calls for other-regarding action and seeks to inculcate other-regarding motives." Id. at 215.
In other words, the victim subsidizes the defendant's wrongdoing by receiving as a remedy an amount
equal to her harm rather than the defendant's gain; the gain retained by the defendant above the
measure of the harm represents the subsidy. In contrast, "a profits remedy discourages potential
invaders from circumventing the bargaining process and appropriating the protected interest without
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selection of a remedial measure based on the nature of the wrong and
the value we place as a society on preventing that type of wrong.3"9
Where deterrence is the goal, deprivation of all profit is essential.3"
While the California Supreme Court's concerns with aggregate
disgorgement in Johnson are valid to an extent, it nevertheless deserves
serious reconsideration. When compared to the multiple punishment
permitted with respect to criminal defendants, it seems that courts and
commentators have overstated the problem of multiple punishment in
the civil context.33" ' It is reasonable for a state to award punitive damages
that reflect the entire amount of profit gained from the specific tortious
conduct within the state during a specific period of time.332 And in cases
first securing its holder's consent. Thus the measure of profits deters nonconsensual invasions." Id.
329. See id. at 210-59. "Appropriations that invade the plaintiff's identity, physical integrity, or
land trigger a rather severe measure of recovery, which allows the plaintiff to choose between the fair
market value of the resources or of its unauthorized use and the net profit gained by the invader. By
contrast, there are resources the invasion of which triggers pecuniary recovery only if the defendant
employed improper means." Id. at 217. For instance, Dagan distinguishes between "conscious
infringements of constitutive resources that should give rise to a profits-based recovery and similar
infringements of fungible resources [such as patents] that should not." Id. at 232-33.
330. "[I]f the law is interested in vindicating control of the entitlement holder over her resource, it
must secure an effective deterrence. This can be achieved only by insisting that each defendant be
liable for the amount it has gained by the infringement." Id. at 234.
331. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
332. As the court noted in Johnson, it would be necessary to show that the entire course of conduct
was wrongful. See Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 113 P.3d 82, 94-96 (Cal. 2005). For an analysis of the
value of a disgorgement or restitution approach to punitive damages, see Galligan, supra note 325, at
119-20, 13o-36 (asserting that because not all victims of the defendant's tortious conduct may sue the
defendant and because compensatory damages might not reflect actual harm, damages should be
augmented to ensure "optimal deterrence"). Galligan advocated an economic approach to damages
that recognizes that defendants should be forced to internalize the cost of harm they inflict on others:
Pursuant to such a theory [of "societal compensatory damages"], the jury's award of
compensatory damages would consist of two parts: individual damages designed to
compensate the victims before the court, and "societal" damages designed to compensate
others directly harmed but not before the court.... The focus upon societal damages is also
closely linked to the economic theory of deterrence: Just as compensatory damages
simultaneously redress losses suffered by the plaintiff and deter defendant wrongdoing by
forcing the defendant to internalize these costs in his or her cost-benefit decisionmaking, so
too do societal compensatory damages simultaneously redress losses suffered by society and
deter wrongdoing by forcing cost internalization.
Id. at 141-42 (quoting Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J.
347, 353-54 (2003)). A possible solution to the problem of multiple disgorgements is to award the first
plaintiff with a measure of punitive damages that reflects the profitability of the defendant's wrongful
conduct during one year, but with that amount paid into a trust. The trust could be kept open for a
period of time-such as one year beyond the statute of limitations for causes of action that accrued
during the year in which the prevailing plaintiff's cause of action accrued. Thus, taking the example of
Johnson v. Ford, the measure of $to million, reflecting Ford's savings due to its noncompliance with
the Lemon Law during one year, could be paid into a trust and retained until the statute of limitations
for injuries contemporaneous with that of the Johnson's has run. This hypothetical ignores the fact
that the plaintiffs in Johnson did not actually prove the amount Ford saved by not complying with the
Lemon Law. See Johnson, 113 P.3d at 94-96. If other plaintiffs prevail against Ford for the same
tortious conduct occurring during the same year in which the conduct toward the Johnsons occurred,
then those other plaintiffs could split the trust with the Johnsons at some date after the expiration of
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of particularly reprehensible conduct, disgorgement of amounts in excess
of profits should be permissible.
The proposed Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment takes the approach that "[a] conscious wrongdoer may not
lawfully profit from a wrongful act." '333 Proposed section 3 provides: "A
person who interferes with the legally protected rights of another, acting
without justification and in conscious disregard of the other's rights, is
liable to the other for any profit realized by such interference." '334 The
comments distinguish between the "overlapping theories of liability" that
measure damages in terms of "the benefit to the defendant" and "the
injury to the plaintiff." '335 By emphasizing State Farm's proportionality
rule and relying on compensatory damages as the measure of the
plaintiff's injury, the U.S. Supreme Court disregards this important
distinction and downplays the necessity of depriving the wrongdoer of
the benefit of his conduct. The Court's proportionality rule measures
damages in terms of the harm to the plaintiff, thereby reflecting a value
choice that compensating a plaintiff for injury is more important than
punishing the defendant and deterring similar conduct in the future. The
proportionality rule does not adequately reflect our values of freedom
and equality or our right not to be intentionally mistreated. In Professor
Dagan's words, the proportionality rule does not reflect the "cherished
libertarian value of control over one's entitlements.
'336
2. Disgorgement Insufficient Where Economic Harm Combined
With Other Harm or Where Harm Unquantifiable
Disgorgement of profits as the measure of punitive damages would
only be appropriate in cases of purely economic harm, however. When a
company disregards the health and safety of others when recklessly or
intentionally engaging in tortious conduct, it should suffer punishment
greater than mere disgorgement of profits. Furthermore, where the
profitability of the defendant's conduct is slight, such that the punitive
damages award would not adequately represent the reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct, a disgorgement measure would not be
the statute of limitations. (The one-year period for the measure of profits is a convenient albeit
arbitrary choice. It may make sense in other cases to employ a longer period.)
For a much more detailed proposal of a similar nature, see Sharkey, supra. Sharkey advocates
creation of an "ex post" class action governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which would
create a fund to compensate absent plaintiffs or "quasi-plaintiffs" not before the court. Id. at 391-41o.
She refers to aggregate punitive damages imposed for repeat conduct against parties not presently
plaintiffs as "societal damages" in recognition of the fact that certain types of conduct cause harm
much beyond the present plaintiff. Id. at 389.
333. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft), § 3 cmt. a
(2000).
334. Id. § 3.
335. Id. § 3 cmt. a.
336. DAGAN, supra note 327, at 214.
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appropriate. But in cases similar to that of Johnson, it seems an adequate
solution to the difficult problem of multiple punishment and the
desirability of disgorgement for deterrence purposes.
Even in a case of purely economic harm, punitive damages greater
than profits may be merited where that conduct cannot be quantified.
For instance, an award of $5 million in punitive damages for a breach of
contract action in which compensatory damages were only $50,000, may
be warranted by virtue of a wealthy defendant's racist motivation, as in
Bains LLC v. Arco Products Co.337 The plaintiff in Bains was a company
wholly owned by Indian Sikhs that transported gasoline by tanker truck
under contract with Arco. The Bains employees (most of whom were
Sikhs) were subjected to repeated racist epithets and discriminatory
treatment by various employees of the defendant, and Bains eventually
had its contract terminated after complaining of the treatment to upper
management."38 A jury awarded compensatory damages of $50,000 for
breach of contract and one dollar for the section I981 violation, and
punitive damages of $5 million.339 However, the Ninth Circuit ordered a
reduction in punitive damages to fit within the State Farm "ratio
approach." Specifically, it determined that under State Farm, the award
required reduction to between $300,000 and $450,000. 340 The court noted
that this was a case of purely economic harm and hence "not the 'rare
case' for which State Farm leaves room" for punitive damages
significantly higher than a single digit ratio above compensatory
damages.34 '
By strictly applying the proportionality rule, the Ninth Circuit's
analysis in Bains completely disregarded the nature of the defendant's
conduct, which involved much more than a breach of contract and
deprivation of employment opportunities. Instead of ordering a
reduction in punitive damages, the Ninth Circuit should have affirmed
the award in recognition of the fact that the plaintiff was constrained, in
suing in its capacity as a limited liability company, from seeking
compensation for its many employees who were subjected to the
defendant's ongoing malevolent, discriminatory treatment. Further, the
Sikh owners of the company suffered much more than economic harm;
they suffered ongoing degradation and humiliation that no party should
be forced to endure. The Ninth Circuit's approach to this case
exemplifies the point that punitive damages cannot be imposed in a
mechanical fashion without due regard to the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct. The court's opinion supports the argument made by
337- 405 F.3d 764 (9 th Cir. 2005).
338. Id. at 767-68.
339. Id. at 769.
340. Id. at 777.
341. Id.
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one commentator regarding an overly rigid application of ratios:
"Further refinement of the reprehensibility factor may prove particularly
critical if State Farm's ratio instructions result in punitive damages
awards that under-deter defendant misconduct by adhering too strictly to
the Court's 4:1 benchmark or applying its I:i ratio too aggressively.""34
B. PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S WEALTH
Since State Farm's proportionality rule was expounded, California
courts have continued to consider evidence of the defendant's financial
condition, recognizing that State Farm did not disavow the use of wealth
in assessing punitive damages. However, because "wealth cannot justify
an otherwise unconstitutional award," courts have used that evidence
either to sustain or reduce punitive damages awards.343 In Boeken v.
Philip Morris, Inc., one court noted:
The principle of federalism remains in play: "[E]ach State may make
its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or
342. Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages: Why State Farm Won't Be The
Last Word, 37 AKRON L. REV. 779, 799 (2004). Hines argued that the Court left several issues
ambiguous or unresolved in State Farm, which will necessitate further attention. Those issues include
the nature of reprehensibility, what factors warrant a higher ratio, what factors merit a lower ratio, the
role of the defendant's wealth, and aggregate punitive damages. Id. 799-811.
343. See, e.g., Czarnik v. Illumina, Inc., No. Do4 1o3 4, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS IO909, at *31
(Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2004) (stating that "the use of a defendant's wealth as a factor in assessing punitive
damages is not inappropriate," but refusing to justify a ratio higher than one to one where
compensatory damages were $2.2 million, because State Farm wrote that wealth "'cannot justify an
otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award"'); Streetscenes, L.L.C. v. ITC Entm't Group, Inc.,
No. B168835, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1o671, at *18 (Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2004) (stating that even
if a punitive damages award satisfies federal due process, it must still be evaluated for excessiveness
under California law, which requires consideration of the defendant's wealth); Alberts v. Franklin, No.
Do4o3Io, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5698, at *97 (Ct. App. June 16, 2004) (affirming the use of
jury instructions that included consideration of the defendant's financial condition because State Farm
did not prohibit "use of the defendant's wealth as a factor in assessing punitive damages"; rather, "it
simply 'cannot make up for the failure of other factors, such as 'reprehensibility,' to constrain
significantly an award").
The defendant's financial condition thus continues to be relevant in affirming punitive damages
awards. See Rodriguez v. Padilla, No. B16943i, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7735, at *16 (Ct. App.
Aug. 24, 2004) (rejecting the defendant's claim that punitive damages of $250,000 were excessive in
relation to defendant's net worth of approximately $164,500). But see Textron Fin. Corp. v. Nat'l
Union Fire Ins. Co., tI8 Cal. App. 4th IO6i, lO8 4 (Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument
that the wealth of the defendant justified a ratio of punitive to compensatory damages of ten to one
because the amount must "comport[] with due process. The Supreme Court has recognized that '[tihe
wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award."').
California courts also continue to evaluate the defendant's financial condition for purposes of
lowering punitive damages awards. See, e.g., Laursen v. Pope & Pope, No. Ho264 9 5 , 2003 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS I IO64, at *20-22 (Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004) (reducing punitive damages from $750,ooo to
$295,000 because the higher amount comprised approximately twenty-five percent of the defendant's
net worth, which was "excessive as a matter of law"); Rogers v. Franck, No. AIoo655, 2004 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 3o78, at *58-59 (Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2004) (finding award of $400,ooo in punitive damages
where defendant had a negative net worth "excessive as a matter of law," even though the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages was not excessive under State Farm).
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proscribed within its borders, and each State alone can determine what
measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts
within its jurisdiction.""
The court in Boeken held that although the punitive damages award of
$3 billion was not excessive in relation to the tobacco company
defendant's wealth, nonetheless it required reduction to $50 million,
representing approximately nine times the compensatory damages
awarded. "'
Many argue that presenting evidence of the defendant's wealth, even
after the decision to impose punitive damages has been made, prejudices
the jury's determination of the amount of punitive damages."46 Others
counter that such a view denigrates the jury function that forms the basis
of our civil justice system. 7 Still others argue that without such evidence,
"a jury will be encouraged (indeed, required) to speculate as to a
defendant's net worth in seeking to return a verdict that will
appropriately punish the defendant. '349 Resolving this matter requires a
policy judgment as to whether it is preferable to avoid jury speculation or
bias against wealthy defendants. Alternatively, one might ask whether
jury speculation poses a greater problem than jury bias. There is no easy
answer. The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed concern about juries'
unguided discretion. Providing evidence of the defendant's financial
condition arguably provides some guidance. On the other hand, the
Court has also expressed concern about jury bias. California courts
currently review jury awards of punitive damages and uphold them if
there is "substantial evidence" to support the jury's finding.349 This
review combined with the higher standard of proof may be sufficient to
justify presenting evidence of the defendant's financial condition.
However, given the Supreme Court's expressions of concern about
the presentation of evidence of the defendant's wealth to the jury,350 it
344. Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 682 (Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied Philip
Morris USA Inc. v. Boeken, 2006 WL 684912 (quoting State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422
(2003)).
345. Id. at 682-83, 687.
346. See, e.g., Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 16, at 1377.
347. See supra note 206.
348. Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1353 (Cal. i99i); see also Galanter & Luban, supra note
162, at 1431 (arguing that "it is rational for the jury to take the defendant's wealth into account, for
only in this way will a jury be able to guess at 'what it reasonably takes to attract the defendant's
attention'). Galanter & Luban discuss the cost-benefit analysis performed by Ford with respect to its
Pinto automobile, which it knew was capable of exploding when rear-ended at low speeds. See id. at
1436-37 ("Ford's reliance on cost-benefit analysis indicated that it could be deterred only if it lost
money through its decision, and the jury's punitive damages were calculated precisely to annihilate
Ford's profit." (citing Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358 (Ct. App. 198i))).
349. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 986 (Cal. 1978).
350. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (stating that
"evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express
biases against big business, particularly those without strong local presences"); supra text
March 2006]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
might be necessary-or at least prudent-to change California's current
practice. One solution to this problem would be to permit only evidence
regarding the profitability of the defendant's conduct during the punitive
damages portion of the trial. Profitability ensures that evidence is
directly relevant to the issue, provided California authorizes a
disgorgement approach. If the defendant engaged in an ongoing course
of conduct, then evidence pertaining to profits gained from that entire
course of conduct would be relevant. Likewise, if the defendant is not a
repeat offender, then only the profitability of the defendant's conduct
vis-a-vis the plaintiff would be relevant. In situations where a defendant's
conduct may not have been economically beneficial, or where the benefit
is difficult to quantify, then evidence of the defendant's wealth may be
relevant to prove inequality of bargaining power or to ensure sufficient
punishment. If a plaintiff can show that the defendant took advantage of
its position of greater wealth and power (i.e., to manipulate the plaintiff
into denying its rights or to defraud the plaintiff), then the financial
condition of the defendant would be particularly relevant evidence for
the purpose of punitive damages.
In cases where the foregoing scenarios do not apply, California could
restrict the use of financial evidence to judicial review. "' For example, if
the defendant contests the amount of punitive damages awarded on
grounds that it is excessive relative to the defendant's financial condition,
then the defendant could be required to submit evidence of its financial
condition to the reviewing judge. This would shift the burden of proof
from the plaintiff-who is currently required to present evidence of the
defendant's financial condition to obtain an award of punitive damages-
to the defendant.
In State Farm, the Supreme Court expressed concern about imposing
punitive damages that are equivalent to criminal penalties without
providing the kinds of protections available in a criminal proceeding.35 '
The California Supreme Court could reaffirm the imposition of punitive
damages without regard to a fixed ratio by emphasizing the many
procedural protections the state has in place for defendants. To further
strengthen an already strong system, California should consider further
statutory changes. For one, the legislature could increase the standard of
proof as to whether the defendant had the requisite intent353 to beyond a
reasonable doubt. The state could require that the jury impose punitive
damages only upon a unanimous decision, and that the jury unanimously
accompanying notes IO9-I i.
351. See Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 16, at 1377 ("Legislatures can correct this prejudicial
approach by allowing courts to consider wealth in determining whether an award is excessive or
inadequate, but they should not allow the 'wealth factor' to be paraded before juries.").
352. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417.
353. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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reach a determination of the amount of the punitive damages. These
requirements would ensure that the jury speaks as the voice of the
community in identifying and punishing truly despicable conduct. So as
to prevent juries from being swayed by passion and prejudice, evidence
of the defendant's wealth could be reserved for the reviewing judge,
unless it is shown to be directly relevant. Or, such evidence could be
reserved for a motion for reconsideration of a verdict on excessiveness
grounds. This would prevent wealth from being a factor that artificially
inflates punitive damages awards. Instead, it would assist the reviewing
judge in determining if the award exceeds the defendant's ability to pay.
At minimum, the courts must recognize that no single one-size-fits-all
approach will satisfy the legitimate deterrence and punishment objectives
of punitive damages. "Due process cannot be satisfied by resort to such a
sledgehammer approach .... While confusing and imprecise, State
Farm's proportionality instructions require a far more nuanced and fact-
specific inquiry into the constitutionality of any award."
35 4
C. CALIFORNIA COURTS SHOULD AVOID AN UNCRITICAL ADHERENCE TO
THE PROPORTIONALITY RULE
Establishing a ratio between compensatory and punitive damages
does not necessarily ensure that punishment is proportionate to the
offense. Compensatory damages might not reflect the harm inflicted or
the degree to which the public abhors the defendant's conduct.
California Supreme Court Justice Mosk wrote:
Our case law reveals a number of instances of intentionally harmful
conduct in which only nominal actual damages were awarded because
such damages were difficult to quantify, but in which punitive damages
hundreds or thousands of times greater were assessed.... In these
cases, the seriousness of the defendant's misconduct was more
important than actual damages in gauging the appropriate amount of
the punitive damages award. 
5
The U.S. Supreme Court's proportionality rule does not take into
consideration the substantive law that may limit compensatory damages.
For example, in Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, discussed above,"56
the plaintiff died before the trial, and her estate was prohibited by law
from recovering on her emotional distress claim.357 As such, the plaintiff's
354. Hines, supra note 342, at 802.
355. Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 993 P.2d 388,395 (Cal. 2000) (citations omitted).
356. See supra text accompanying notes 176-81.
357. See Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 985 n.3 (Cal. 1978). In Rufo v. Simpson, the
estates of Ronald Goldman and Nicole Brown Simpson were limited by statute from recovering
compensatory damages in excess of the personal property damage incurred during their murders. See
IO3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492, 522 & r.14 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 377-34). A strict ratio
of compensatory to punitive damages would thus have resulted in nominal punitive damages being
awarded to the victims' estates for their murders. Instead, the court affirmed awards of $12.5 million in
punitive damages to each victim's estate. The parents of Ronald Goldman were awarded $8. 5 million
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compensatory damages were less than $io,ooo.3" s For these reasons, sole
reliance on the proportion between compensatory and punitive damages
arrives at arbitrary results.
A perhaps even worse result is that imposing a ceiling on punitive
damages makes it theoretically possible for parties to calculate in
advance whether they can profit from tortious conduct.359 Professors
Galanter and Luban argue:
[W]ith lenient punitive damages awards, offenders will be tempted to
treat the law not as a norm demanding compliance but merely as a type
of tax on activity such as predatory pricing.... Only by imposing
punitive damages of a different order from compensatory damages can
a jury convey the message that a norm is categorical, that it demands
compliance and not cost-benefit analysis. The point is to make the
numbers on the balance sheet so ridiculous that the offender stops
looking at the balance sheet.3"
As the California Supreme Court has noted, "the function of
deterrence.., will not be served if the wealth of the defendant allows
him to absorb the award with little or no discomfort. ' ' , 6' Enabling
defendants to factor potential punitive damages into the cost of doing
business deprives courts and society of the ability to achieve the
legitimate goals of punishment and deterrence.
CONCLUSION
California courts should resist blindly applying a fixed ratio of
punitive damages to compensatory damages. The U.S. Supreme Court
does not demand it, and California's interests are antithetical to it. When
the facts of a case warrant a higher ratio, California courts should not
hesitate to vindicate the state's legitimate interest in policing intentional
egregious tortious conduct. California should continue to recognize that
wealthy defendants should not be permitted to purchase the right to
engage in despicable conduct or to profit from such conduct. True
deterrence can only be achieved by an appropriate calculus-one that
acknowledges that a defendant's own cost-benefit analysis can defeat the
in compensatory damages in the wrongful death cause of action, but California law prohibits awards of
punitive damages in an heir's wrongful death cause of action, id. (citing CAL. CODE Civ. PROC.
§ 377.61); therefore, the compensatory damages thus awarded could not have served as a comparator
for an award of punitive damages.
358. Neal, 582 P.2d at 985.
359. See, e.g., Galanter & Luban, supra note 162, at i43o-32; Mallor & Roberts, On the Path, supra
note 54, at 1003 ("If a punitive damages award can be known with certainty in advance of the conduct,
the very sort of callousness that is to be corrected by a punitive award would be facilitated; the
defendant would be able to calculate his maximum exposure to liability and determine whether to
disregard the interests of the plaintiff.").
360. Galanter & Luban. supra note 162, at 1430.
361. Neal, 582 P.2d at 990.
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state's effort to proscribe harmful conduct.362
California can defend its continued use of the defendant's financial
condition as an evidentiary tool by pointing to its long history, its
justifications, and the U.S. Supreme Court's failure to reject its use
entirely.363 In addition, by providing the most stringent procedural
protections possible within a civil justice system, California can comply
fully with the Court's many legitimate procedural due process concerns
without blindly following its ill-considered substantive due process. As
the Court stated, "[gireat care must be taken to avoid use of the civil
process to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed only after the
heightened protections of a criminal trial have been observed. '' 364 If the
state provides heightened procedural protections, then significant
punitive damages awards in appropriate cases should survive a due
process challenge.
362. See Geraci, supra note 99, at 19-22.
[A] cost-benefit analysis is directly at odds with the purpose of punitive damages, which is
to deter future conduct of the tortfeasor. The effectiveness of the deterrence portion of
punitive damages is its unpredictability. If punitive damages can become so predictable to
allow a corporation to make a cost-benefit analysis, then the corporation could internalize
the value of human life.
Id. at 20.
363. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 427.
364. Id. at 428.
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